The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to the European Union) by Enriques, Luca et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2013 
The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to 
the European Union) 
Luca Enriques 
lucaenriques@gmail.com 
Ronald J. Gilson 
Columbia Law School, rgilson@law.columbia.edu 
Alessio M. Pacces 
ampacces@libero.it 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson & Alessio M. Pacces, The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an 
Application to the European Union), HARVARD BUSINESS LAW REVIEW, VOL. 4, P. 85, 2014; EUROPEAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (ECGI) LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 212/2013; STANFORD LAW & ECONOMICS OLIN WORKING 
PAPER NO. 444; COLUMBIA LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 450 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1804 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926
Law Working Paper N°. 212/2013
May 2013
Luca Enriques
Harvard Law School, LUISS University and ECGI
Ronald J. Gilson
Columbia Law School, Stanford Law School and 
ECGI
Alessio M. Pacces
Erasmus University Rotterdam and ECGI
© Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson and Alessio M. 
Pacces 2013. All rights reserved. Short sections of 
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted 
without explicit permission provided that full credit, 
including © notice, is given to the source.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2258926
www.ecgi.org/wp
The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law
(with an Application to the European Union)
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926
ECGI Working Paper Series in Law
Working Paper N°. 212/2013
May 2013
Luca Enriques
 Ronald J. Gilson
Alessio M. Pacces
The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law
(with an Application to the European Union)
We wish to thank Jesse Fried, José Maria Garrido, Henry Hansmann, Klaus Hopt, David Kershaw, Jon Macey, 
Joe McCahery, Roberta Romano, Jaap Winter, and participants in the conference “European Takeover Law 
– The Way Forward” at the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, in the conference on “Fiduciary Duties in 
Corporate Law” at Tilburg University, and in seminars at Harvard, University of Pennsylvania, Vanderbilt, and 
Yale Law School for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
© Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson and Alessio M. Pacces 2013. All rights reserved. Short sections 
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full 
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.










The Case for an Unbiased  
Takeover Law (with an Application 
to the European Union) 
 
Luca Enriques 
Harvard Law School, LUISS University and ECGI 
 
Ronald J. Gilson 
Columbia Law School, Stanford Law School and ECGI 
 
Alessio M. Pacces 





John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics 
Stanford Law School  
Stanford, California 94305     
 
 
Working Paper Series    





This paper can be downloaded without charge from the  
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258926
Abstract
Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow 
individual companies to decide the contestability of their control. Based on this premise, 
we advocate a takeover law exclusively made of default and menu rules supporting an 
effective choice of the takeover regime at the company level. For reasons of political 
economy bearing on the reform process, we argue that different default rules should apply 
to newly public companies and companies that are already public when the new regime is 
introduced. The fi rst group should be governed by default rules crafted against the interest 
of management and of controlling shareholders, because these are more effi cient on average 
and/or easier to opt out of when they are or become ineffi cient for the particular company. 
The second set of companies should instead be governed by default rules matching the 
status quo even if this favors the incumbents. This regulatory dualism strategy is intended 
to overcome the resistance of vested interests towards effi cient regulatory change. 
Appropriate menu rules should be available to both groups of companies in order to ease 
opt-out of unfi t defaults. Finally, we argue that European takeover law should be reshaped 
along these lines. Particularly, the board neutrality rule and the mandatory bid rule should 
become defaults that only individual companies, rather than member states, can opt out of. 
The overhauled Takeover Directive should also include menu rules, for instance a poison 
pill defense and a time-based breakthrough rule. Existing companies would continue to be 
governed by the status quo until incumbents decide to opt into the new regime.
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THE CASE FOR AN UNBIASED






Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but in-
stead allow individual companies to decide the contestability of their control.
Based on this premise, we advocate a takeover law exclusively made of default
and menu rules supporting an effective choice of the takeover regime at the
company level. For political economy reasons, we argue that different default
rules should apply to newly public companies and companies that are already
public when the new regime is introduced. Newly public companies should be
governed by default rules that favor the interests of (minority) shareholders over
those of management and controlling shareholders, because these are more effi-
cient on average and easier to opt out of when they are or become inefficient for
the particular company. Companies that are already public when the new re-
gime is introduced should instead be governed by default rules matching the
status quo, even if this favors the incumbents. This regulatory dualism strategy is
intended to overcome the resistance of vested interests towards efficient regula-
tory change. Appropriate menu rules should be available to both groups of com-
panies in order to ease opt-out of unfit defaults. Finally, we argue that European
takeover law should be reshaped along these lines. Particularly, the board neu-
trality rule and the mandatory bid rule should become defaults that only individ-
ual companies, rather than member states, can opt out of. The overhauled
Takeover Directive should also include menu rules, for instance a poison pill
defense and a time-based breakthrough rule. Existing companies would continue
to be governed by the status quo until incumbents decide to opt into the new
regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Takeovers remain the most controversial corporate governance mecha-
nism. Since the early 1960s, the debate has been over whether regulation
should promote or impede attempts to acquire control of a corporation by
making an unsolicited offer directly to shareholders.
The dogged persistence of the debate reflects the internal logic of two
conflicting positions.1 According to pro-takeover commentators, takeovers
are generally beneficial for corporate governance. Takeovers can displace
poorly performing managers.2 Ex ante, the threat of displacement encour-
ages better performance. When management is unable to see past existing
industry patterns and recognize the opportunity for strategic change, hostile
takeovers, possibly initiated by bidders from outside the industry, can facili-
tate corporate restructuring.3 From this perspective, regulation should en-
courage takeovers by restricting the ability of managers to block a takeover
bid, leaving to shareholders, comprised increasingly of sophisticated institu-
tional investors,4 the decision whether the bid will succeed.5
1 The stylized presentation that follows of the two standard conflicting views cannot re-
flect the richness of the debate and the variety of nuanced positions scholars have taken
therein. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitake-
over Charter Provisions As Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 480–89 (2003). For a
survey of the economic literature on takeovers, see, e.g., Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa
Ro¨ell, Corporate Law and Governance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 833,
848–53, 877–86 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
2 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 162–74 (1991).
3 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmoniz-
ing the European Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 163–64
(1992); Klaus J. Hopt, Obstacles to Corporate Restructuring: Observations from a European
and a German Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES IN COMPANY LAW AND FINANCIAL REGULATION
373, 373–78 (Michel Tison et al. eds., 2009).
4 By the late 2000s, for example, institutional investors held over seventy percent of the
outstanding shares of the one thousand largest U.S. public corporations and the ten largest
institutions owned more than twenty-five percent of the outstanding shares in many large pub-
lic corporations. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capital-
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Other observers have a darker view. Those who oppose hostile take-
overs argue that they can disrupt well-functioning companies6 and encourage
short-termism, as opposed to long-term commitments to shareholder value.
From this perspective, managers have better information than shareholders,
who will apply a myopically high discount rate to managers’ long-term
plans.7
In this article, we reject a categorical pro- or anti-takeover position,
instead taking what we will call an “unbiased” stance on the desirability of
takeovers. While takeovers may be efficient in the aggregate,8 the efficiency
of individual takeovers and individual companies’ exposure thereto depends
on a variety of factors. These factors include the production functions of
companies, conditions in the relevant industry, the problems confronting the
corporation, and the best response to those problems. Because all of these
factors may differ from company to company and over time, the appropriate
stance to takeovers in each case may also differ. Consequently, we posit that
takeover regulation should sanction individual company efforts to devise a
takeover regime appropriate to their own, mutable circumstances.
ism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863,
863–65 (2013).
5 Some commentators, including one of us, have taken a more moderate position, arguing
in favor of allowing directors to expend corporate resources, either to persuade shareholders
that rejecting a hostile bid would create more value than offered by the bidder, or to provide
shareholders a more valuable alternative. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids
Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35
STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treat-
ment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1985).
6 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18–20 (1987). Still others share the negative view of hostile takeovers, but
without the pro-management underpinning. They see managers as disloyal agents who will
protect their positions one way or another. If they cannot block a hostile takeover directly, they
will block it indirectly by taking substantive actions that will make the corporation less attrac-
tive to hostile bidders at a cost to shareholders that exceeds that of blocking a hostile offer. See
Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulatable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (2003). Because regulation cannot effectively constrain self-interested
managers, the second best solution is to reduce their incentive to do their worst. Id. These
commentators thus favor restricting hostile takeovers, whether by allowing the target board of
directors to prevent shareholders from accepting them or by making bids costlier via
regulation.
7 For discussions of the argument that public company management overly discounts the
future, see, e.g., Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only)
Relatively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787 (2003). On the claim that stock markets are short-
termist, see John Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Mak-
ing, DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION & SKILLS 14–22 (July 23, 2012), https://www.
gov.uk/government/consultations/the-kay-review-of-uk-equity-markets-and-long-term-deci-
sion-making.
8 See Sandra Betton et al., Corporate Takeovers, in 2 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE
291, 358–74 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 1st ed. 2008) (arguing, on the basis of event studies, that the
combined returns of target and acquiring companies are positive on average). But see Klaus
Gugler et al., Market Optimism and Merger Waves, 33 MGMT. DECISION ECON. 159, 170–72
(2012) (showing that, in as much as overvaluation of the acquirers’ stock is a determinant of
takeovers, the long-term wealth effects of takeovers are negative on average).
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Put differently, we propose a kind of horizontal subsidiarity approach.9
Regulation of takeovers should defer to choices made at the level best suited
to a nuanced assessment of particular circumstances and industries: that of
the individual target company. From this perspective, takeover regulation’s
central role is to set the default rules governing the available responses to a
takeover. These rules will be subject to opt-out by individual companies. The
likelihood of opt-out will depend on the rules governing the corporation, and
on whether the constituency that such rules empower—whether it is man-
agement, controlling or minority shareholders—welcomes the change. Ac-
cordingly, our policy goal here is to determine both the default rules and the
means of altering those rules so that choice or inertia at the individual com-
pany level is not biased for or against takeovers.
Our unbiased approach reflects an effort to move the debate beyond
categorical positions in which mandatory rules are insensitive to context.
Takeovers are one of a range of governance mechanisms, the optimal mix of
which, for a particular company, should be endogenous to a significant ex-
tent. The conditions a corporation confronts can be expected to change over
time, thus reinforcing the endogeneity of the “right” mix of governance
techniques rather than a mandatory set specified at any one point in time.
And while we make recommendations about the correct default rules, these
are made with careful attention to their structure, the method by which they
can be changed, and the realities of political economy surrounding takeover
regulation.
In the debate over takeovers, the pro- and anti-takeover positions are
typically framed as addressing a simple question: who should decide
whether a hostile takeover goes forward? There are three obvious candi-
dates. First, the board may be given the power to block an offer. Second, the
board may be restricted from acting to hinder a takeover, thereby allocating
the decision to shareholders. In this vein, the U.K. City Code on Takeovers
and Mergers and English company law more broadly disarm the board by
prohibiting actions that prevent shareholders from deciding on a bid.10 Third,
9 In the European Union jargon, horizontal subsidiarity refers to the preference for self-
regulation by private actors over (European or national) regulation from public bodies, as
expressed in the Conclusions of the Presidency, Edinburgh European Council (Dec. 12, 1992).
See, e.g., Edward Best, Alternative Methods and EU Policy-Making: What Does “Co-Regula-
tion” Really Mean?, EIPASCOPE, no. 2, 2008, at 11. To be sure, no one has so far used the term
to refer to the relationship between private ordering and mandatory provisions in the context of
company law. Vertical subsidiarity (or subsidiarity tout court), as enshrined in Article 5(3) of
the Treaty on European Union, refers instead to a preference for national or local legislation in
matters in which the European Union has no exclusive competence. See, e.g., Kees Van Kes-
bergen & Bertjan Verbeek, The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union, 32 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 215 (1994).
10 The City Code restricts the board’s ability to adopt defensive tactics that would frustrate
an unwelcome bid, unless shareholders authorize it. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,
Rule 21 (The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, 11 ed. 2013) (U.K.). On board neutrality as a
more general feature of English company law see David Kershaw, The Illusion of Importance:
Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition, 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 267 (2007).
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the final decision could be left to the courts. That would imply the applica-
tion of a standard and hence the possibility of taking context into account
when determining whether the board or the shareholders should decide. Over
most of the last 25 years, this has been the Delaware approach.11
We argue that individual companies should be able to decide who de-
cides. Deferring to the choices of individual companies, however, implies
more than mere advocacy of freedom of contract in takeover law. In a world
of positive transaction costs, the selection of the default rules matters
greatly, as do the procedures by which they can be changed.12 The crucial
question for an unbiased takeover law thus becomes the choice of the default
rules: the rules that apply unless companies provide otherwise in their gov-
erning documents, whether initially or as later amended. Selecting the right
default rules based on the conditions for opting out at different points in time
facilitates efficient, as opposed to inertial or opportunistic, choices at the
company level.
Default rules matter both for newly public companies (IPO companies)
and for those companies already public when a new default regime is intro-
duced (installed-base companies). In the former, setting the default rules that
suit the majority of IPO companies saves transaction costs. As we argue
below, this generally speaks in favor of defaults that do not restrict take-
overs. More importantly, while a company’s efficient exposure to takeovers
may vary across time, defaults tend to be sticky.13 Takeover-unrestrictive
defaults are easier to change if they turn out to be inefficient down the road.
From an economic perspective, takeover-unrestrictive defaults would
also be generally preferable for installed-base companies. However, the mat-
ter stands differently from a political economy perspective. In fact, the intro-
duction of takeover-unrestrictive default rules is bound to be opposed by
those having an interest in existing takeover-restrictive default rules; simi-
larly, those having an interest in existing mandatory rules will likely resist
their becoming defaults. These vested interests may successfully oppose reg-
ulatory change, thereby depriving IPO companies of the opportunity to bene-
fit from the establishment of an unbiased takeover law. To address this
problem, we propose to reform takeover law based on a model of regulatory
dualism.14 Regulatory dualism implies that reform makes two regimes avail-
able. The new, unbiased defaults will apply to IPO companies. Installed-base
companies will instead remain subject to the existing regime, unless those
having endowments therein agree to opt out of it. This solution seeks to mute
11 See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001).
12 See generally Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules,
121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012).
13 Default rules are sticky, particularly in corporate law. See Henry Hansmann, Corpora-
tion and Contract, 8 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 1, 4–5 (2006).
14 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory
Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the
European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475 (2011).
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incumbent opposition to regulatory change by granting them the right to veto
a move away from the status quo at the company level. However, such a
move is still possible to the extent that parties are willing to contract upon
their endowments.15
To illustrate how an unbiased regime would work, we contrast our ap-
proach with the current European Union (EU) takeover regime, whose main
rules are included in the Takeover Bid Directive (the Directive).16 We start
with the core policy choice on whether the board or the shareholders should
make the final decision on a hostile bid. We argue that, in contrast with the
current regime in all EU member states aside from Italy, the rule should be
that shareholders decide unless IPO companies choose otherwise. We then
extend the unbiased approach to the provisions that are more important in
the presence of a controlling shareholder, where takeovers are typically
friendly. In this context, we argue that the rules mainly affecting the take-
over decision should be pro-minority shareholders by default, not because
we believe that minority shareholders will more often be in need of protec-
tion, but because at the IPO stage they can be persuaded to give up protec-
tion only if this is efficient. Two prominent applications of this reasoning are
a one-share-one-vote default (1S1V) and a rule conferring upon minority
shareholders the right to sell their shares at the same price as the outgoing
controller. The latter provision, which is takeover-restrictive, is reminiscent
of the mandatory bid rule under Article 5 of the Directive. In the unbiased
regime we advocate, the mandatory bid rule should become a default rule.
Finally, we contend that menu rules, which do not apply by default but
can be adopted by a company, are an important complement to default rules
in an unbiased takeover regime for two reasons. First, the existence of menu
rules facilitates opt-out by those companies for which the default regime is
inefficient.17 Second, menu rules established at the EU level would displace,
if chosen, incompatible mandatory rules set at the member state level,
thereby countering the residual opposition to the unbiased regime that can be
expected from the vested interests despite regulatory dualism.18
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section II presents
the economic case for an unbiased takeover law. Section III discusses the
different criteria for choosing default rules for IPO companies and for in-
stalled-base companies. Section IV applies this framework to the EU, illus-
15 Current examples of such contracting include the holders of a class of common stock
with enhanced voting rights agreeing to give up their extra voting rights. For a description of a
current effort by a Canadian public company to eliminate the heightened voting rights of one
class of shares in a public company, see generally Bernard S. Black, Equity Decoupling and
Empty Voting: The Telus Zero-Premium Share Swap, 16 M&A LAW. 1 (Oct. 2012).
16 Directive 2004/25/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 Apr. 2004
on Takeover Bids, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 [hereinafter the Directive].
17 See infra text accompanying notes 71–74.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 149–50.
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trating how a review of the Directive could result in the introduction of an
unbiased takeover regime. Section V concludes.
II. ECONOMICS OF TAKEOVERS:
THE CASE FOR UNBIASED TAKEOVER REGULATION
Takeover law should allow individual companies to decide their degree
of takeover exposure. No single rule insensitive to context and strategy will
perfectly distinguish between value-increasing and value-reducing take-
overs. However, economic analysis counsels in favor of a default rule that
assigns decision rights to shareholders. In this section, we take up the basis
for this default rule.
At the outset, a qualification is in order concerning how we differenti-
ate value-creating from value-reducing takeovers. Whether a particular take-
over is efficient depends on whether the winners’ gains exceed the losers’
losses net of transaction costs.19 Importantly, we ignore here the wealth ef-
fects of takeovers on non-shareholder constituencies (employees, customers,
local communities, the national economy, and the like—typically referred to
unhelpfully in the aggregate as “stakeholders”) and focus only on the joint
gain of the acquiring and the target company measured in terms of share-
holder value.
Our point is not that non-shareholder gains or losses are either irrele-
vant or necessarily of limited magnitude. Rather, the point is that takeovers
are merely one way in which corporations respond to changes in economic
conditions. Competition can force corporations to fire workers, lower wages,
or close plants that are important to a community. Takeovers are, in this
respect, just one mechanism through which competition operates and equili-
bration occurs. Serious issues of political economy frame how a particular
country addresses competition’s effect on non-shareholders, including those
resulting from (hostile) takeovers.20 For our purposes, the scope and the fea-
tures of the safety net protecting individuals and communities against the
effects of economic and regulatory change are only relevant to the takeover
debate if takeover regulation is the best (or the only) protection tool availa-
ble. Because we have not seen that position carefully presented in the take-
over debate, our discussion of takeover regulation in the following does not
further consider it.
The central problem in crafting takeover rules is that decisions about
whether a takeover goes forward are made ex ante based on probabilistic
information, while the ultimate efficiency of the takeover is revealed only ex
19 This is a Kaldor-Hicks measure of welfare: a move is efficient if those who benefit from
it can compensate the losers and still be better off. See generally John R. Hicks, The Founda-
tions of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
20 See generally VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COM-
PARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
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post. A decision-maker can approve a takeover that existing information
suggests will be value-reducing because: (1) she is mistaken: she misinter-
prets the existing facts and so overestimates the transaction’s ex post value;
(2) she pursues personal benefits (such as empire building or the potential to
loot); or (3) she believes that the market will mistakenly overvalue the trans-
action ex post, whether due to poor information or myopia.
In turn, the decision-maker can make ex ante mistakes in rejecting a
value-increasing takeover for reasons that parallel those associated with mis-
taken acceptance. The decision-maker may reject a takeover because: (1) she
is mistaken: she misinterprets the existing facts and so underestimates the
takeover’s ex post joint value; (2) she pursues personal benefits (such as
entrenching herself or sustaining a bad strategy that increases the value of
the management’s real option on control);21 (3) she is hyperopic, i.e., she
mistakenly applies too low a discount rate to future revenues.
Traditionally, takeover law has attempted to answer the “who decides”
question on an aggregate basis. The idea is that if the law allocates the deci-
sion regarding whether to proceed with a certain takeover to the right deci-
sion maker, good transactions will go through and bad ones will be stopped
more often than under alternative regimes (including the option of having no
mandatory rule in place at all). With respect to takeovers of public compa-
nies with dispersed ownership, the fundamental policy choice then becomes
whether the ultimate decision to let a takeover bid go forward is allocated to
the board or to the shareholders. The board may be subject to constraints,
including pressure from incumbent management to resist the takeover. On
the other hand, the shareholders would normally be limited to public infor-
mation in assessing the merits of a proposed transaction.22
Similarly, with respect to blockholder-controlled companies, the ques-
tion is whether controlling shareholders should be limited in their ability to
enter into, or to block, a control transaction. These limits mainly include two
sets of rules. On the one hand, there are rules intended to protect minority
shareholders from transactions that favor the dominant shareholder, e.g., the
mandatory bid rule or the requirement that certain transactions be authorized
by a majority of the minority shareholders. On the other hand, there are rules
aimed at facilitating takeovers by constraining controlling shareholders’ abil-
21 In this formulation, management holds a call option on the benefits of control. The
value of this option can be increased by extending the period over which the option can be
exercised, even if the current strategy has a negative net present value.
22 Delaware’s intermediate standard, announced in Unocal, held out the possibility of a
third decision-maker: the courts. Under the initial framing of this intermediate standard, the
court independently would review any defensive action based on the presence of a threat and
the proportionality of the response. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Rainier Kraakman, Dela-
ware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality
Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989). Over time, the intermediate standard has largely collapsed
into an allocation of decision making to the target board, so long as the hostile bidder’s chance
of success in a proxy fight to replace the board with members who will redeem the pill is not
mathematically or practically impossible. See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later,
supra note 11, at 500–01. R
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ity to entrench themselves (e.g., a 1S1V mandate) or to block an offer (e.g.,
via the so-called breakthrough rule devised in the Directive).23
The problem with this one-size-fits-all approach is that no single rule
allows only value-increasing transactions to go through in either setting. Re-
gardless of which party is accorded discretion with respect to a takeover—
management, shareholders, a controlling shareholder, or a court—the risk of
error remains, whether because of mistake or of self-interest. From this per-
spective, the most that takeover law can accomplish is to set general screens
that minimize the average impact of biases across the population of compa-
nies. However, there is an alternative to general screens that apply the same
rules to all companies and all transactions under all circumstances. Takeover
regulation could allow an individual company to select the screen that will
minimize the impact of its own decision-maker’s biases. As we argue below,
under certain conditions this approach may fare better than a general, one-
size-fits-all screen mandated by regulation.
A. Companies With Dispersed Ownership
In companies without a controlling shareholder, the crucial point is
whether allocating power to the board to block a takeover better differenti-
ates between value-increasing and value-decreasing than allocating the deci-
sion to the shareholders.24 Let us first consider the advantages and
disadvantages of allowing the board to block hostile takeovers, for example
by adopting a poison pill, to prevent shareholders from tendering enough
shares to approve a takeover the board does not favor.25 Managers may have
23 See infra text accompanying notes 126–28.
24 This part builds upon Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton and Rowe’s Apologia for Delaware: A
Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 40–46 (2002). The United States’ experience illustrates
that the poison pill concept requires more detail to be useful. The text assumes that a poison
pill actually allows the board to block a hostile bid. For some period of time, the Delaware
Chancery Court allowed the adoption of a pill and its use to secure the board time to present
shareholders with information or an alternative, but still required that, in the end, shareholders
have the right to decide whether to accept the offer. Thereafter, the Delaware Supreme Court
allowed a company to use the pill to force resolution of a bid to take place through a proxy
contest to replace board members with the bidder’s nominees who presumably would redeem
the pill and let the bid go to the shareholders. See Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, supra
note 11, at 500–01. This tension between the rule the Chancery Court believes correct and that R
imposed by the Supreme Court remains. See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.,
16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). This, in turn, caused the pill’s effectiveness to depend on whether
a particular company had a staggered board, which would force a bidder to win two proxy
contests in order to replace a majority of the board. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 887, 919–24 (2002) (explaining how prohibitively costly a hostile takeover attempt is if
winning two board elections is needed to succeed). Finally, target companies remained subject
to capital market pressures regardless of structural defences. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover
Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 893–99 (2002) (showing how market forces have shaped adap-
tive responses to developments in Delaware case law on takeovers).
25 When we refer to a “shareholders decide” default rule, we consciously assume away
the problem of shareholder coercion in tender offers for two reasons. First, in most developed
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better information than shareholders about a particular takeover; resistance,
then, could be motivated on this ground. However, managers may have con-
flicted motives and also may be cognitively biased. Underperforming man-
agers can be reluctant to acknowledge mistakes, explaining bad strategy as
market misvaluation.26 The combination of self-interest and cognitive bias
can lead to managerial hyperopia. Managers may honestly (in the sense that
cognitive biases are not intentional), but incorrectly, believe that their view
of the company value will eventually be proven right despite temporary un-
derperformance. And, consciously or not, they may also push this view op-
portunistically in order to protect their positions.27
The flip side of the coin is that management may in fact know some-
thing that the market does not know. This potential information asymmetry
is the primary reason why shareholder assessment of a takeover bid also may
be biased. From this perspective, the shareholders’ information costs of eval-
uating a takeover bid are higher when company value depends on future
growth options, which in turn depend importantly on management decisions
that remain to be made. This is precisely the kind of circumstance when the
claim that managers have an information advantage is most plausible.28 In
these circumstances, shareholders may be myopic compared to management.
Other factors may also contribute to shareholders’ acting myopically
compared to managers. Some institutional investors may be rationally ori-
ented to the short-term, either because their positions are levered (and thus
they can bear losses only for a limited amount of time), or because they are
subject to rational herding, both as entities and internally as a result of
agency costs within their organizations.29 Finally, shareholders may be sub-
jurisdictions, the presence of a set of “traffic” rules, like minimum offer length, proration,
disclosure requirements, and so on, significantly attenuates the problem. See, e.g., Paul Davies
& Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 225, 248–56 (2d ed. 2009). Second, reconcentration of share ownership in the
hands of institutional shareholders (see supra note 4) further reduces coordination problems R
among target shareholders. On pressure to tender, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pres-
sure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987).
26 This bias involves finding more psychologically supportive explanations for personal
failures. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).  Fest-
inger’s development of a cognitive path dependence bias in decisions over whether to continue
an existing strategy is an obvious precursor to the influential work of Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky concerning biases in decision making that has served as the foundation for
behavioral finance and economics. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND
SLOW (2011).
27 In this regard, note that the incumbency of managers whose strategies are performing
poorly functions as a real option whose value is increased by extending the duration of the
option by delaying or blocking a takeover. A similar analysis has been applied with respect to
management incumbency in the context of bankruptcy: managerial power to retain control in
bankruptcy is priced as an option in measuring deviation from absolute priority. Julian Franks,
Empirical Investigation of US Firms in Reorganizations, 44 J. FIN. 747, 768 (1989).
28 In a sense, this explanation parallels the pecking order theory of capital structure. See
Stewart Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 195–96 (1984).
29 Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40 EUR.
ECON. REV. 603, 607–09 (1996).
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ject to cognitive biases and be irrationally short-termist. This argument,
however, is deployed far more frequently than it is supported given the con-
centration of shareholdings in institutions rather than individuals and the
fact—which we discuss below—that institutional investors are not all
alike.30
The bottom line is that choosing either screen will lead to some ineffi-
ciency. If board veto is chosen, value-decreasing takeovers are more likely
to be stopped. However, value-increasing takeovers may be foregone as well
because of managerial opportunism and mistake. Conversely, under share-
holder choice, value-increasing takeovers are more likely to go through, but
some value-decreasing takeovers also may occur because of shareholders’
comparatively higher information costs and other possible sources of short-
termism.
Yet, shareholder choice has some general advantages over board veto
that in our view make it a better screen on average.31 First, managers’ infor-
mation advantage can be reduced by disclosure, although this can work only
to the extent that disclosure does not undermine the value of proprietary
information (disclosing managers’ ideas could benefit competitors), and only
if managers can make their disclosure credible in light of the managers’ in-
centive to overstate the value of long-term projects.32
Second and more important, the impact of managerial self-interest and
cognitive bias is likely more significant than that of shareholder ignorance
and irrationality. To the extent that shareholders are not alike and their biases
are not correlated across types, some of their biases are likely to regress out
in the market, whereas we are unaware of any regression mechanism that
reduces the impact of managerial biases, which are likely to be correlated.
To be sure, institutional investors may have correlated biases too, for exam-
ple because of leverage (particularly if it is widespread across institutions)33
or rational herding on the length of investment horizons. However, the cru-
cial point is that while at least some, if not many, of the errors based on
shareholder biases are likely to be corrected by the heterogeneity of share-
holders, the same result cannot be expected for management biases.
Therefore, were one required to choose a single screen among a set of
imperfect options, on average, shareholder choice would get the call. But
that still leaves another question, typically neglected in the policy debate on
takeover law: can an on-average, second-best, solution be improved by al-
lowing individual companies to choose their own takeover regime? If the
30 To be sure, individuals within organizations may be systematically irrational, or the
organization may be ineffective at constraining irrational behavior by its agents, but this is a
more complicated argument, which must be made rather than assumed.
31 See Gilson, supra note 11, at 502. R
32 See Myers & Majluf, supra note 28.
33 The leverage concern may be overstated because many institutions, which collectively
hold more equity than hedge funds, are limited in their ability to leverage their holdings.
Mutual funds, which hold approximately 25% of equities in the U.S., are an important exam-
ple. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 886. R
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most effective takeover screen depends on the circumstances affecting indi-
vidual companies, presuming appropriate mechanisms of choice, an even
better screen is simply to let companies choose their own takeover regime.
Indeed, we believe that under certain circumstances departing from a share-
holder choice regime can be efficient for some companies, although argua-
bly not for the majority of them.
First, the information asymmetry argument that provides the principal
support for allocating decision authority over takeovers to the board will be
stronger in certain industries and at certain points of a firm’s lifecycle. In
general, the information gap is more likely to be limited, and less costly to
reduce through disclosure, in those industries and companies where manage-
ment performance is measured, relatively speaking, by the effective dis-
charge of the tasks the market anticipates.34 This will particularly be the case
where innovation is linear: good managers will anticipate customer needs
and deliver on production and distribution. But one can expect quite the
opposite in industries characterized by non-linear innovation, particularly if
a company has only recently gone public or experienced significant restruc-
turing. When company value depends heavily on future growth options, then
stock price depends heavily on characteristics that are difficult to observe.
Current performance may then be a noisy indicator of skill and effort, carry-
ing a more significant risk that value-decreasing takeovers occur because of
shareholder misinformation.35
Second, the impact of shareholder short-termism based on information
asymmetry depends not only on the company’s characteristics, but also on
the type and concentration of institutional ownership. These factors affect
the likelihood that the market regresses out shareholder mistakes. For in-
stance, absent sizeable ownership by long-term investors, it may be efficient
for companies with high earnings volatility (a likely pattern for companies in
markets where non-linear innovation makes the future more difficult to pre-
dict) to temper the shareholder choice regime in order to reduce the risk that
value-decreasing takeovers are triggered by what turns out to be temporary
underperformance.36
Finally, full exposure to takeovers is not always good. In certain com-
panies—especially those companies suffering from information asymmetries
34 See OLIVER D. HART, FIRM, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 126 (1995).
35 See Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, In-
vestment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers, 19 RAND J. ECON. 516, 529–31
(1988).
36 When institutional ownership is characterized by transient investors, short-termism may
ensue. Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings Over Long-Run
Value?, 18 CONT. ACCT. RES. 207 (2001). But see A. Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market
Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia, 64 J. FIN. 2481, 2504 (2009) (“[S]hort-term trading may
in fact support long-term investment”). Activist investors, whose goal is explicitly to influence
corporate policy, may have a short-term bias; however, it is usually the case that they can
influence corporate policy only if they can persuade institutional investors that their position is
correct. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4, at 899. R
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in favor of management, resulting in shareholders’ short-termism—insulat-
ing management from hostile takeovers can be a strategy to promote innova-
tion while saving on overall managerial compensation.37 This argument
parallels the long-standing debate over whether management’s investments
in firm-specific human capital might be lost by shareholders accepting a
hostile bid.38 Seemingly, one way to cope with this problem is to award
golden parachutes to managers who lose their jobs in the event of a success-
ful hostile takeover.
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that increased compensa-
tion in return for a commitment by management to make the “right” level of
firm-specific human capital investment, and not to undertake business strate-
gies that indirectly discourage takeover bids is not a workable contract.
Neither the “correct” level of managerial investment nor the motive for
management-determined strategy is readily observable and verifiable. The
compensation contract thus reduces to a commitment to pay managers in the
event of a takeover, but without an enforceable reciprocal commitment from
management. Recent research shows that only particular combinations of
managerial entrenchment with a pay structure rewarding late success may
make sense, particularly with an eye towards innovation.39 Whether and
under what circumstances this kind of trade-off can increase firm value is an
empirical question that has yet to be resolved.40
B. Companies With a Controlling Shareholder
For companies with controlling shareholders, the question for takeover
law remains structurally the same as for widely-held companies: is there a
single allocation of decision-making authority that effectively screens good
37 Cf. Andres Almazan & Javier Suarez, Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal
Governance Structures, 58 J. FIN. 519, 519–20, 538–39 (2003) (stating that shareholders may
reduce compensation costs by giving more power to the CEO); Gustavo Manso, Motivating
Innovation, 66 J. FIN. 1823, 1846–47 (2011) (stating that shareholders may promote innovation
by committing not to fire a manager).
38 For a discussion of the latter debate, see Oliver E. Williamson, Comment on Andrei
Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKE-
OVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 65 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988), and Monika Schnit-
zer, “Breach of Trust” in Takeovers and the Optimal Corporate Charter, 43 J. INDUS. ECON.
229, 230 (1995). Masahiko Aoki stresses the interdependency between employees’ incentive to
invest in firm-specific human capital and protection of management from control challenges in
Japanese firms where innovation is linear and decision-making is horizontal. Masahiko Aoki,
Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE, 1 (1990).
39 See Manso, supra note 37, at 1839–44. R
40 But see Thomas J. Chemmanur & Xuan Tian, Do Anti-Takeover Provisions Spur Corpo-
rate Innovation?, 29 (AFA 2012 Chi. Meetings Paper, Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1572219 (stating that antitakeover provisions tend to increase value for firms
engaged in “intensive innovation” and tend to decrease value otherwise); and Mark
Humphery-Jenner, Takeover Defenses, Innovation and Value Creation: Evidence from the Ac-
quisition Decisions, STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 668 (2014) (showing that, in “hard-to-value” com-
panies, antitakeover provisions support innovation-driven acquisitions instead of encouraging
empire building).
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transactions—ones that make controlling and minority shareholders net bet-
ter off—from bad ones? We similarly argue that there is no optimal one-
size-fits-all solution to this problem because no single screen will separate
value-enhancing from value-reducing control transactions.
The choice in this setting is between a legal framework that lets control-
ling shareholders decide whether and under what circumstances to part with
control and one that imposes mandatory restrictions on such a choice. The
two main restrictions on controlling shareholders’ discretion over control
transactions are a pro-takeover, mandatory 1S1V provision and the takeover-
restrictive mandatory bid rule (or other equivalent restrictions such as a ma-
jority of the minority approval of control transactions). To understand why
neither pro-takeover nor anti-takeover rules would univocally lead to a supe-
rior setting for control transactions, we have to focus on how private benefits
of control affect controlling shareholders’ decisions.
Private benefits of control come in at least two kinds: pecuniary and
non-pecuniary.41 Pecuniary private benefits are extracted at the expense of
minority shareholders.42 Non-pecuniary private benefits of control differ
from the pecuniary kind in that they do not directly transfer resources from
minority to controlling shareholders, but only reward the latter with utilities
unattainable by the former.43 A common example is the ownership of a ma-
jor newspaper or media company, which can provide the controlling share-
holder social status and political influence.44   Controlling shareholders may
appropriate private benefits of control through the ordinary operation of the
business or they may take the capitalized value of operational private bene-
fits through a control transaction.
Private benefits are not a problem per se. They compensate controlling
shareholders for the costs of monitoring management (or directly managing
the business) and for the foregone diversification of a significant financial
investment.45 From the perspective of minority shareholders, the level of pri-
41 Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating
the Comparative Taxonomy, 199 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1663–64 (2006). For two alternate tax-
onomies of private benefits of control, see ALESSIO M. PACCES, RETHINKING CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTROL POWERS 84–87 (2012), and John C. Coates
IV, Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?, in
REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE 677, 690–94 (Guido Ferrarini et al.
eds., 2004).
42 See generally Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black, & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and
Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1 (2011) (discussing the effectiveness of U.S. rules limiting tunnel-
ing by managers and controlling shareholders of public companies).
43 Gilson, supra note 41, at 1663–64.
44 Consider, for example, the Murdoch family with respect to News Corp. and the Berlus-
coni family with respect to Mediaset, a broadcasting company based in Italy. Hollinger Inc. v.
Hollinger Int’l Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004) illustrates by reference to Conrad Black’s
newspaper empire that pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefits of control are not mutu-
ally exclusive. See id. at 355–56  (Black both profited from significant ownership shares in
equity and was able to name political allies to key management positions.).
45 Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Con-
trol, 53 J. FINANCE 1, 2–3 (1998). See also William B. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Incom-
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vate benefits is analogous to the costs of overcoming agency problems in
widely held companies. The key, whether through regulation or contract, is
to allow controlling shareholders to credibly commit to levels of private ben-
efits that leave the minority shareholders net better off, and thus are effi-
cient.46 When this commitment is credible, there is a strong case for letting
controlling shareholders decide about changes in control. When the commit-
ment to extract private benefits of control efficiently is lacking or is not
credible, the controlling shareholder’s decision will likely be biased. The
problem is that the expected direction of the bias is not the same for every
company.
A controlling shareholder may block a value-increasing takeover when
she extracts pecuniary private benefits of control through the company’s on-
going operations, but the present value of these benefits exceeds the pre-
mium the controller would receive from the takeover. This may be because
the underlying legal or contractual rules do not allow the controlling share-
holder to credibly commit to an efficient level of private benefits or because
private benefits are extracted to an efficient level and the transaction under-
compensates them.47 In the latter case, it is actually efficient that the transac-
tion fails to go through.48 In the former case, inefficiently high levels of
private benefits of control prevent transactions that would benefit minority
shareholders more than controllers stand to lose. A 1S1V mandate could
temper this effect inasmuch as it makes the inefficient extraction of private
benefits of control less profitable for a controlling shareholder.49 From this
perspective, mandatory 1S1V rules can be understood as an ex ante, second-
best substitute for ex post judicial enforcement of an efficient level of pri-
vate benefits of control, especially in jurisdictions without an effective court
system. However, because 1S1V mandates cannot displace the incentive to
extract inefficient levels of private benefits of control when the legal system
plete Contracts Theories of the Firm and Comparative Corporate Governance, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES IN LAW 745 (2001).
46 See Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: Ex
Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 J. INST. & THEORETICAL
ECON. 160, 171 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Private Bene-
fits of Control, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182781; PACCES, supra note 41, at R
133–45.
47 One example in which pecuniary private benefits may be extracted efficiently is the
presence of larger synergy gains from participation in a corporate group. See, e.g., Luigi Zin-
gales, Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 425, 428
(1995).
48 The transaction that fails to go through would only apparently be value-increasing: once
the efficient extraction of private benefits by the incumbent is accounted for, the net gains
disappear.
49 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Eq-
uity: The Mechanisms and Agency Cost of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in
CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 313–14 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000).
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allows it, rules of this kind are not very effective in promoting value-increas-
ing takeovers;50 and, as we explain below, they may have other drawbacks.51
The presence of pecuniary private benefits of control can also make a
particular type of value-decreasing takeovers more likely. Controlling share-
holders could agree to sell their blocks to someone who is able to extract
higher private benefits from minority shareholders, for instance, because the
acquirer is able to divert resources or opportunities to other companies of the
group she controls, while the existing controlling shareholders had commit-
ted to capping ongoing extraction of private benefits by restricting related
party transactions.52 Takeover-restrictive rules, like the mandatory bid rule,
can prevent such value-decreasing transactions from going through, but they
come at a cost: the mandatory bid also operates as an additional curb to
value-increasing takeovers. By ruling out the payment of a control premium
to the seller alone, the mandatory bid rule makes it even more difficult for
prospective acquirers to compensate the incumbent controller’s private bene-
fits in order to effect a value-increasing transaction.
In countries with high-quality corporate law and effective courts, or in
companies where controllers can credibly commit to dealing fairly with mi-
nority shareholders, pecuniary private benefits are usually not substantial.53
However, controlling shareholders may still receive non-pecuniary private
benefits of control. These benefits can also be a source of bias when it comes
to screening out takeovers, but even more than in the case of pecuniary pri-
vate benefits of control, the bias does not unambiguously lead to an ineffi-
cient outcome.54
Controlling shareholders will refuse to part with control so long as they
believe that the control premium that prospective acquirers offer them
under-compensates their private benefits. As in the case of management of
widely held public companies, they also may oppose the takeover for unself-
ish reasons, about which they may or may not be right; for instance, they
may believe that the offer underestimates the company’s intrinsic value. In
the absence of expropriation, the controlling shareholder’s decision to resist
a takeover may depend on stubbornness (i.e., failure to acknowledge un-
derperformance), better information (i.e., knowing something that the mar-
ket either does not know or misunderstands), or non-pecuniary private
benefits of control not valued by the bidder. However, in these circum-
stances there is an important reason to consider the controlling shareholder’s
50 Legal rules promoting takeovers cannot impose contestability. This is at best a partial,
indirect approach to limiting private benefits of control to efficient levels. See, e.g., Luca
Enriques, Corporate Governance Reforms in Italy: What Has Been Done and What is Left to
Do, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 477, 492 (2009); PACCES, supra note 41, at 157. R
51 See infra text preceding note 55.
52 See Gilson & Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits, supra note 46.
53 Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Com-
parison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 575–89 (2004)
54 See PACCES, supra note 41, at 103–08. R
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assessment a valid screen of takeovers: because controlling shareholders
have a very substantial investment in the company, they stand to lose the
most from their mistakes and to gain the most from their superior knowl-
edge. In sum, because they bet their own money, they serve as a useful
screen for value-increasing takeovers.
The fact that a controlling shareholder may have levered control, for
example, through dual-class stock, changes the analysis slightly, but not the
result. Consider a founder choosing to go public with a dual-class shares
voting structure, for example, Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook. At the IPO
stage, Zuckerberg bears part of the cost of using a dual-class structure to
protect his control: the price Zuckerberg receives for the shares he sells in
the IPO is reduced, as is his proportionate interest in the proceeds that the
company receives for the stock it sells. No additional cost arises unless ei-
ther Zuckerberg or the company chooses to sell more stock, in which event
Zuckerberg can choose to give up levered control if the discount is too high.
Minority shareholders suffer no future cost because they paid the control-
discounted price.
The crucial point is that the controlling shareholder both pays a price
for the restriction on future takeovers and retains an option to remove the
overhang of the restriction on the value of his retained stock and on the price
of future company stock sales. If the market underestimates the level of pri-
vate benefits that the controlling shareholder takes, then the structure will
have worked to the disadvantage of minority shareholders. However, this
trade-off can also work to the advantage of minority shareholders. This
would occur when at some point the price of the restriction (the market dis-
count on non-controlling stock) becomes higher than the subjective value of
non-pecuniary private benefits (the demanded premium on the controlling
stock), so that removing the restrictions generates net gains.55 Finally, lever-
aged control structures may allow a talented entrepreneur to secure scale and
scope economies associated with her talent.56 The result may be that the opti-
mal controlling ownership departs from fifty percent of the shares. While
55 See generally Alessio M. Pacces, Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Ben-
efits of Control (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Law Working Paper 131/2009, 2009), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1448164 (explaining why dual
class shares may be established at the IPO stage).
56 A response to this point is that it flies in the face of Miller-Modigliani capital structure
irrelevancy: it claims a benefit for a particular kind of equity financing. While it is beyond the
scope of our effort here to fully address the issue, we note that these capital structures emerge
primarily in circumstances characterized by entrepreneurial effort and high uncertainty result-
ing from the importance of future growth options to the value of the company. Information
costs can be expected to be high in these circumstances, one setting in which the irrelevancy
proposition fails. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Concentrated Ownership Revisited:
Idiosyncratic Value and Agency Costs (Columbia Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 444,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2228194 (developing
the theme that some controlling owners seek control to protect their special capacity to create
value in the context of the corporation’s business, which accrue to all shareholders, rather than
private benefits of control, which accrue only to the controller if they exceed the value that is
shared with the minority.  Since those circumstances will occur most commonly when future
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1S1V is only moderately helpful when pecuniary private benefits of control
are inefficiently extracted, in all of the other situations—particularly in the
presence of non-pecuniary private benefits—a 1S1V mandate may prevent
the efficient ownership structure from being chosen.
In short, for controlled companies, the most effective structure of take-
over regulation is the same as for widely distributed companies: a default
rule that can be altered by individual companies. The efficient screen is cho-
sen at the company level, not the legislative level. For controlled companies,
the efficiency of both pro-takeover and anti-takeover rules depends on the
nature and size of the private benefits of control involved, which in turn vary
with individual companies and their stages of development, relevant industry
conditions, and the jurisdiction where they are established. Importantly, de-
termining the efficient screen is a dynamic process: all of these individual
circumstances may change over time.
III. DESIGNING AN UNBIASED TAKEOVER LAW
A. Default and Menu Rules Matter
We have argued in the previous section that where no single screen
distinguishes between efficient and inefficient takeovers in the aggregate,
the most efficient takeover rules are those set at the individual company
level. That leaves what we have characterized as the central question in the
design of an unbiased takeover law: what rules should govern takeovers if a
company does not specify particularized takeover rules? In other words,
what should the default takeover regime be?
This question is important for two reasons. First, companies may prefer
to retain the statutory defaults. Studies of jurisdictions featuring significant
freedom of contract in corporate law show that companies tend to underuse
this freedom, although the explanations for this are unclear.57 Moreover,
companies even at the IPO stage appear more inclined to opt in to takeover-
restrictive rules than to opt out of them when they are default.58 In this situa-
tion, the default takeover regime should be unrestrictive.59 If shareholder
growth options are important, the information problem arises importantly in these
circumstances.).
57 Hansmann, supra note 13 (surveying the explanations in the literature and why they are R
not satisfactory).
58 Yair Listokin, What do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Exami-
nation, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279, 295 (2009) (showing that 57 percent of IPO compa-
nies incorporated in Georgia opted in to a fair price statute when it was passed, whereas 97
percent of IPO companies incorporated in states passing opt-out fair price statutes stuck with
the antitakeover default); see also Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maxi-
mize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 95 (2001)
(stating that where there is a controlling shareholder, the bias in favor of antitakeover provi-
sions at the IPO stage may reflect their option-like character in that setting).
59 Our proposal for a default mandatory bid rule would be the exception. The reasons for
such an exception are outlined in section III.B.
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choice is more efficient in the aggregate, as we argued in section II.A, this
default would fit the majority of companies, subject to founders or existing
management choosing to retain (and pay for) an option on control.60 Perhaps
more importantly, such a default would also be easier to opt out of for those
companies that it does not fit.
Recent theory stresses that a key consideration in the design of default
arrangements should be the ease with which the default arrangements can be
altered by contract.61 In the presence of different types of companies for
whom differing exposure to takeovers may be efficient at different points in
their development and in different business conditions, altering the default
arrangement should be easier to accomplish for those companies for which
the default is inefficient than for those for which it is efficient. In both kinds
of companies the management or the controlling shareholder can be ex-
pected to have easier access to the mechanisms by which the default rule can
be altered than non-controlling shareholders.62 Rules that favor the latter are
thus comparatively cheaper to opt out of, but importantly the cost of doing
so is not zero. Default rules set against the interest of management or con-
trolling shareholders are still sticky if non-controlling shareholders can pe-
nalize an inefficient choice by reducing the price they are willing to pay in
an IPO or by voting against a proposal to move to an inefficient rule later on.
Arguably, the balance of costs and benefits from altering the default varies
with the type of company and the concentration of minority shareholders.63
Because the costs of opting out of a pro-takeover default would only be
borne in the presence of offsetting benefits, such a sticky default effectively
screens for the companies for which the takeover restriction is efficient.64
This choice of default rules would not undermine the unbiased charac-
ter of the regime as we have defined it; shareholders of an individual com-
pany could choose to empower management with takeover-restrictive rules,
like board veto or variations thereof, or in the case of a company with a
controlling shareholder, vest continued control in that shareholder through a
leveraged control structure. However, that should be reflected explicitly in
60 See supra text accompanying note 56.
61 See Ian Ayres, supra note 12 at 2043–46.
62 In the setting of widely held companies, see generally Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819 (1981); Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REV. 111 (1987).
63 The relative difference in the cost of altering the default rules may be ameliorated by the
reconcentration of equity ownership, as has taken place in the U.S. See supra note 4. Parallel- R
ing the reconcentration, for example, an increasing number of companies have redeemed
poison pills by board action and eliminated staggered boards by charter amendment. See, e.g.,
Randall J. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Share-
holder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368 (2007); Re-Jin
Guo, Timothy A. Kruse, & Tom Nohel, Activism and the Shift to Annual Elections (July 6,
2012), http://tigger.uic.edu/~rguo/WP_dboard_2012.pdf.
64 See Ayres, supra note 12, at 2086–92 (stating that sticky defaults help screen for effi-
cient opt-out in contract law).
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the company’s charter. The founders can be expected to choose takeover-
restrictive screens efficiently because they are betting their own money and,
in the case of the use of a leveraged control structure, retain the largely
unilateral option of giving it up should circumstances change.65  In all
events, the inefficiency can be expected to be reflected in the price paid by
the minority.66
There is a second reason why defaults matter. Changes in the default
rule in connection with takeover regime reform can dramatically affect in-
stalled-base companies when the previous default allowed the board to re-
strict takeovers. In these circumstances, the articles of incorporation of these
companies normally would be silent on the issues covered by the new take-
over defaults; and new default rules may prove de facto mandatory, espe-
cially where opting out requires consent from both the board and the
shareholders.67
Applying the new regime to installed-base companies thus creates a
two-sided opportunism problem. One side reflects the potential for opportu-
nism by those in control of these companies. Managers and controlling
shareholders could seek to retain, or campaign for opting into, incumbent-
friendly rules for reasons of self-interest, despite their inefficiency for the
individual company. The other side reflects the potential opportunism of dis-
persed or minority shareholders in changing a previously accepted rule by,
for example, purchasing shares of a company with a pro-management take-
over regime and then seeking to change it. The appropriate choice of default
rules (including procedural rules for opting out of defaults) could counter
65 See, e.g., Anete Pajuste, Determinants and Consequences of the Unification of Dual-
Class Shares (EUR. CENT. BANK Working Paper No. 465, Mar. 2005) (analyzing determinants
and consequences of dual-class shares unifications using a database comprising 108 European
firms which unified dual-class shares between 1996 and 2002).
66 In their influential article, Daines and Klausner (Daines & Klausner, supra note 58, at R
113) speculate that their findings may be evidence that antitakeover provisions are not priced
in the IPO market. What they find is that none of the efficiency explanations they consider
(namely bargaining power, myopia, and private benefits) explain antitakeover provisions. The
authors themselves concede that they cannot rule out the efficiency of antitakeover provisions,
particularly when idiosyncratic private benefits are not measurable and may be matching a low
cost of antitakeover provisions. The authors also offer the plausible interpretation that the
structure of venture capital arrangements contemplate that the founders retain an option to
retake control from investors if the company is successful—that is, if the company achieves an
IPO. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, Venture Capital and the Structure of
Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998) (stating that the
structure of venture capital financing incentivizes management by providing an option on con-
trol exercisable on the occurrence of an IPO).
67 The problem here is not that the existing companies would be caught by surprise: obvi-
ously, the transition to the new regime will give existing companies the time and the opportu-
nity to amend their articles of association. The crucial issues, which we discuss below, are the
rules governing the amendment; some new default rules may be effectively mandatory because
non-controlling shareholders will not agree to opt out of them, whereas some other rules may
become easier to amend compared to a previously mandatory regime.
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both forms of opportunism.68 But here we face an even more compelling
political economy problem.
Any proposal for reform that contemplates an adverse change of the
status quo for managers, controlling shareholders, or concentrated institu-
tional investors, if only by way of a new default rule, would predictably
trigger organized resistance. Because these interest groups are homogeneous
and sufficiently small, they can be expected to effectively oppose or at least
dilute regulatory reform.69 The long gestation of the Directive, as well as its
outcome, is illustrative of this dynamic.70 To prevent installed-base compa-
nies, which at any single point in time represent the greatest part of a coun-
try’s economy, from blocking a desirable change for IPO companies, we
must take into account the constituencies having interests in maintaining the
status quo when designing an unbiased regime for takeovers. Reform does
not occur in a political vacuum.
An important complement to default rules in an unbiased takeover re-
gime is a set of menu rules available for companies that wish to opt out of
one or more items of the default regime. As the experience in the U.S.
shows, articles of incorporation do not reflect an enabling statute’s invitation
to customization.71 In the few circumstances in which these articles depart
from the statutory defaults, menu provisions are often chosen.72 According to
one interpretation, there are significant network effects involved in provid-
ing off-the-rack legal arrangements.73 To be sure, also private menus could
perform this and other functions of statutory menus.74 But statutory menus
have two advantages over private ones.
For one, statutory menus are more effective at removing uncertainty as
to whether a certain opt-in provision (e.g., a poison pill) is legal. This is a
crucial aspect in the context of takeovers, where the time necessary to estab-
lish private menus through case law may be too long for them to be helpful.
Put differently, statutory menus are meant to reduce the cost of altering a
sticky default, facilitating opt-out by companies that benefit from it. From
this perspective, menu rules support effective choices at the individual com-
pany level, which is in turn an essential element of an unbiased regime.
68 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolu-
tion, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 500–06 (2002).
69 See, e.g., Johan Den Hertog, Economic Theories of Regulation, in 9 REGULATION AND
ECONOMICS 25, 52–53 (Alessio M. Pacces & Roger J. Van den Bergh eds., 2012).
70 See, e.g., Ben Clift, The Second Time as Farce? The EU Takeover Directive, the Clash
of Capitalisms and the Hamstrung Harmonization of European (and French) Corporate Gov-
ernance, 47 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 55, 62–66 (2009) (describing the process that led to the
adoption of a much less pro-takeover directive than the Commission had envisaged).
71 Daines & Klausner, supra note 58.
72 Listokin, supra note 58, at 304-5.
73 Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later,
31 J. CORP. L. 779, 793 (2005).
74 Daniel M. Ha¨userman, The Case Against Statutory Menus in Corporate Law, 9 HAS-
TINGS BUS. L.J. 45, 55–75 (2012) (arguing that all the function of statutory menus, including
network effects, could be more efficiently replicated by private menus).
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The effect of statutory menus on the legal certainty of opt-in provisions
could be theoretically replicated by other solutions.75 For example, safe
harbors could enable a broad range of private menus by stating that take-
over-restrictive charter clauses would not be considered invalid just because
they restrict takeovers; or judicial opinions could specify under what circum-
stances particular opt-in arrangements would be respected.76 These solutions,
however, are not often observed, suggesting that statutory menus have an-
other advantage compared to private menus: they may commit a legislature
to the validity of given opt-in arrangements. This turns out to be especially
useful when another legislative body—in a federal system, for instance, the
state (in the U.S.) or the member state (in the EU) as opposed to the U.S. or
EU level legislative body—or the judiciary may be unwilling to make such a
commitment. Most importantly, their reticence may be due to the influence
of the interest groups concerned with preserving the status quo in the face of
the introduction of a new unbiased regime. Setting menu rules at the legisla-
tive level that is less likely to succumb to that kind of influence is therefore
an important step towards establishing an unbiased takeover regime.
B. IPO Companies
We start with the criteria that should guide the selection of default rules
for IPO companies. One would select the takeover regime that works best on
average while leaving it to individual companies to opt out of the default
provisions that are inefficient under their particular circumstances. This ap-
proach would minimize the transaction costs of contracting around statutory
defaults since efficient opt-out would be relatively infrequent. Furthermore,
the ability to contract around these defaults at minimal cost would allow
individual companies to craft the takeover screens most suitable to their bus-
iness, lifecycle, and ownership structure. The increased use of dual-class vot-
ing structures in U.S. technology companies going public is consistent with
this approach. From the beginning of 2010 through the end of March, 2012,
twenty companies out of the 170 companies that made initial public offer-
ings in the U.S. went to the market with dual-class common stock and other
structural features that allow the controlling shareholders to retain control
with a less than proportional equity investment.77 Facebook is the most visi-
ble current example, but those with only a slightly longer memory will recall
Zynga, Groupon, and Google. This argument leads to a simple criterion for
the default allocation of decision-making powers between managers and
shareholders in takeover bids: allocate decision authority over takeovers to
shareholders.
75 Id. at 74–75.
76 See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (2006).
77 See Controlled Companies in The Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Ten Year Performance
and Risk Review, IRRC Institute 15 (Oct. 2012), http://irrcinstitute.org/pdf/FINAL-Controlled-
Company-ISS-Report.pdf.
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The U.S. experience provides a second and equally important reason for
this default choice. The problem with all the options that our takeover-unbi-
ased regime would, in principle, provide is that companies may fail to
choose any of them and simply stick to the default rules. This concern is
supported by the observation that very few public companies contract
around statutory defaults.78 However, one important difference between the
regime that we are advocating and U.S. takeover law is that, in the latter, the
default rules are not consistently pro-takeover. To the contrary, in Delaware
perhaps the most important decision-making rules, the ones governing adop-
tion and redemption of the poison pill, have evolved into an anti-takeover
regime: boards need not redeem a poison pill so long as a proxy fight re-
mains realistically possible (although management may stack the deck
against the bidder conducting a proxy contest), even if it would take a bidder
two years to replace a majority of the board because of a staggered board.79
Recent empirical studies of U.S. statutory defaults show that companies are
unlikely to opt out of takeover-restrictive defaults in their charter docu-
ments.80 But the opposite is true for pro-takeover rules, which companies do
opt out of, especially in the presence of statutory menus that feature takeover
restrictions.81
This evidence suggests that an appropriate choice of default and menu
rules can effectively enable the selection of the most efficient regime at the
company level. This is exactly what we expect from an unbiased takeover
78 See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 13. R
79 See Airgas, supra note 24; Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, supra note 11. Individ- R
ual companies could elect to redeem their poison pill either by amending governance docu-
ments or redeeming an already outstanding pill. Individual companies could also opt out of the
poison pill at the IPO stage, but apparently this does not happen. See Daines & Klausner,
supra note 58, at 95 (“no firm adopted a [. . .] term limiting the authority of the management
to adopt a [. . .] poison pill in the future”). This analysis is complicated in two respects. First,
the text describes the end point of a judicial process. At various points along the way, the
default takeover rule was much closer to shareholder choice. Even then, there was diversity
among IPOs—a large number of companies simply took the default, whatever it might evolve
into. Hansmann, supra note 13, and Klausner, supra note 73, offer a plausible explanation. R
Uncertainty makes the writing of state-contingent articles costly, due to the chance that the
failure to address an unanticipated event (e.g., a bidder tactic) in bespoke articles will be read
as rejecting any constraints on that event. From this perspective, choosing the default rule
amounts to allocating to the (Delaware) courts the role of updating the articles through the
evolution of its application of fiduciary principles. More recently, however, U.S. companies
have been redeeming or not renewing their poison pills in response to shareholder activism,
likely as a consequence of the reconcentration of shareholdings. See supra note 63.
80 Listokin, supra note 58, at 292–95.
81 Id. See also Daines &  Klausner, supra note 58. This pattern has begun to change in the
U.S. with respect to later changes in company specific takeover rules. As a result of reconcen-
tration of equity ownership (see supra note 4), institutional investors have been able to per- R
suade an increasing number of public corporations with staggered boards to move to annual
elections. See Harvard Shareholder Rights Project 2012 Report, Shareholder Rights Project
(2012), http://srp.law.harvard.edu/releases/SRP-2012-Annual-Report.pdf (last visited May 22,
2014). On the reasons why it may still be rational for the same investors to accept takeover
restrictions at the IPO stage, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrange-
ments, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 730–4 (2003).
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law. In this perspective, a shareholder choice default is to be preferred be-
cause it is easier for individual companies to select a more managerialist
takeover structure with such a default than for them to choose a pro-share-
holder one under the opposite default. Incumbent management has either full
control (up until the IPO) or proposal rights (for charter amendments after
the IPO). In either case, shareholders would have the right to reject the more
restrictive rule, either by not buying in the IPO or by voting against a charter
amendment later on.82 The opposite would be harder to obtain, both because
of collective action problems and, at least in the U.S., because of the require-
ment that a charter amendment first be approved by the board of directors.
Should the board resist efforts to amend the charter, a proxy fight would be
necessary to replace the board. While these barriers are far from insurmount-
able and depend in no small measure on the concentration of public share-
holders, they impose a cost to overcome.
In circumstances without a controlling shareholder, post-IPO changes
are worrisome as they may be motivated by managerial opportunism. Be-
cause of this concern, the procedural rules for charter amendments imple-
menting midstream changes also should presumptively protect shareholder
choice. In other words, any change from pro- to anti-takeover should require
shareholder approval. The founder could contract around this procedural de-
fault and make it easier or more difficult to opt out, for instance by setting
special quorums and/or majorities. However, the parties adopting the restric-
tion bear its cost through the pricing of the IPO, and unless there is a post-
IPO controlling shareholder, the restriction loses its optional character.83 It
may be future generations of management who act to constrain takeovers.
While an unbiased takeover regime could operate with only the default
rules, the additional provision of statutory menus will facilitate a company’s
opting out of the default shareholder choice rule. Providing a non-exclusive
menu of options could benefit companies not just by saving the (likely negli-
gible) costs of negotiating and drafting the restrictive takeover-clauses, but
also by encouraging investors to overcome their reluctance to consider and
price non-standard restrictions when courts and practitioners have not yet
cleared the uncertainties surrounding their enforcement.84
Selecting the most efficient default rules with respect to sales of control
by controlling shareholders is less straightforward. As developed in the pre-
vious section, the case for controlling shareholders having unfettered discre-
tion over whether or not to part with control is strong only under
circumstances when they can credibly set limits on the level of private bene-
fits of control. Such circumstances occur when the legal system will effec-
82 See supra text accompanying notes 59–64.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 55–56.
84 Klausner, supra note 73, 796–97; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mecha-
nisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613–21 (1984) (information costs of under-
standing new securities terms constrain innovation). On the advantages of statutory menus
over private menus, see supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
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tively enforce statutory, judicial, or contractual limits or when there are
industrial organization or reputation-based constraints.85 As the capacity to
credibly commit to levels of private benefits varies considerably among ju-
risdictions,86 which takeover screen would fit the majority of controlled
companies is hard to tell.87 But another criterion for choosing defaults is of
help here: the one justifying what Professors Ayres and Gertner called pen-
alty default rules (i.e., non-majoritarian defaults that prompt a party to dis-
close information useful to the other party in the process of bargaining for an
opt-out).88 Professor Ayres has recently suggested that the notion of such
information-forcing defaults could be extended to an “intermediate” sort of
penalty default rule that seeks to induce only some, and not necessarily the
majority, of contractors to opt out.89 As in the case of widely held compa-
nies, then, default rules should be based on whether they are easier (i.e.
cheaper) to alter by the companies for which opt-out is efficient.
When pecuniary private benefits of control are involved, opportunistic
controlling shareholders are even more worrisome than self-interested man-
agement: controlling shareholders’ self-dealing may go largely unchecked so
long as they control the majority of the votes cast at the general meeting.
This is a good reason to bias the choice of the default rules against control-
ling shareholders. Such a strategy would force founders who want to elimi-
nate barriers to selling control premiums not shared with the minority to do
two things. First, the founder will need to disclose reasons—other than ex-
propriation of minority shareholders—why a deviation from equal sharing of
a control premium is valuable for the company. Second, the founder will
need to allow the market to price the deviation. It also would encourage
innovation in devising strategies to credibly limit the levels of private benefit
extraction. Therefore, a rule restricting controlling shareholders’ freedom to
sell control should be the default.
Now consider a controlling shareholder who wants to enjoy non-pecu-
niary private benefits rather than expropriating minority shareholders. For
her, a restriction on control sales is unfortunate because it prevents her from
having the value of (non-pecuniary) private benefits compensated via a con-
85 Absent such observable limits, the puzzle is deeper than what is the appropriate default
rule. Rather, the task is to explain why we observe any minority shareholders at all. See Ron-
ald J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational
Exchange, 60 STAN. L. REV. 633 (2007); Gilson & Schwartz, Contracting Over Private Bene-
fits, supra note 46.
86 See, e.g., Dyck and Zingales, supra note 53.
87 Because markets price private benefits differently across jurisdictions, see id., the de-
fault rule problem may be less serious than the text suggests. In this circumstance, the chal-
lenge is how to allow controlling shareholders who wish to commit to lower levels of private
benefit extraction to do so credibly in jurisdictions with less effective judicial systems. See
Gilson & Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control, supra note 46.
88 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989).
89 Ayres, supra note 12, at 2116. R
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trol premium.90 Yet a founder who wants to opt out of the restriction has an
incentive to signal her type credibly in order to avoid an excessive discount
on the stock price. That is, she will have to credibly commit to irrevocably
extracting only non-pecuniary private benefits as opposed to pecuniary pri-
vate benefits. This may be an easy exercise in jurisdictions that either im-
pose effective legal limits on private benefits or effectively enforce
contractual limitations, but it may be quite difficult in a number of other
jurisdictions. The crucial point is that a default restriction facilitates the pric-
ing of private benefit extraction by encouraging both disclosure and innova-
tion in devising credible contractual commitments.
The same reasoning would apply to the choice of a default rule gov-
erning deviations from 1S1V. However, in that case it makes little sense to
ask whether 1S1V should be the default because any other default would be
arbitrary: it is hard to imagine a corporate law rule providing that companies
should go public with a disproportionate (how disproportionate?) voting
right for the founder. In other words, once it is accepted that 1S1V should
not be mandatory, it is the natural default.
Because the founder pays the price of control enhancement mechanisms
adopted at the IPO stage, the 1S1V default will screen for those companies
where founders are concerned either with non-pecuniary private benefits of
control91 or can credibly commit to limits on pecuniary private benefit ex-
traction that the market can efficiently price. For these controlling sharehold-
ers, the price of a leveraged control structure would be lower than for those
who choose a leveraged control structure without such limits.92
The preceding discussion addresses the initial choice of a default rule
and a controlling shareholder’s decision to opt out of it. But what about sub-
sequent midstream changes? It is tempting to set the default procedural rules
governing such changes against the controlling shareholder. However, for
reasons identical to those supporting freedom of contract, whenever a con-
trolling shareholder places stock with the investing public, we would not
depart from the general rules governing charter amendments in the case of a
midstream change proffered by a controlling shareholder. If a controlling
shareholder retains sufficient voting rights after an IPO to force control en-
hancement mechanisms midstream, that possibility should be incorporated in
the IPO price.93 Conversely, if the controlling shareholder wants to commit
90 PACCES, supra note 41, at 581–85. R
91 See John Coates IV, Explaining Variations in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, in
89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1305, 1343 (2001).
92 To be sure, problems of credible commitment remain, even if a controlling shareholder
does not opt out of 1S1V. So long as she maintains effective control, the risk of private benefit
extraction remains, although with less incentive.
93 In effect, the controlling shareholder retains a real option to further enhance her control.
John Coates shows that in the U.S., the market does price such midstream changes: there is no
price effect when a company adopts a poison pill; rather all companies are priced as if they
have one. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of
the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 275, 277 (2000).
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not to introduce further control enhancement mechanisms without the inves-
tors’ consent, she can do so credibly through an array of charter provisions
including supermajority requirements or majority of the minority approval
(conditional on effective enforcement).94
C. Are the Efficient Rules for Installed-base Companies Different?
The introduction of an unbiased takeover law for companies that are
already public when the reform is adopted may call for a different approach.
Because the articles of incorporation of existing pubic corporations generally
will not address the issues that the new regime leaves to the individual com-
panies to decide, what are formally default rules in an unbiased takeover
regime may be actually “imposed” on existing companies, in effect shifting
the burden of changing the rules from where it rests for IPO companies.
Typically, opting out of the default rule by an IPO company is up to the
discretion of owner-managers, but the same decision will require share-
holder approval in an installed-base company. This is particularly a problem
in those jurisdictions where, as is the case in some European countries,95 the
key rules depart from the takeover-unbiased defaults we advocate. Moving
from a pro-management to an unbiased default in takeover law thus alters
the status quo for existing companies. This may have unintended conse-
quences with regard to efficiency and result in significant political economy
barriers to takeover reform.96
The first problem is that installed-base companies may end up frozen
into an inefficient regime. In principle, this may happen either because the
new defaults are too difficult to opt out of when they do not fit the circum-
stances of a particular company or because they allow for opportunistic opt-
outs by those in control. Given the criteria informing the choice of default
rules for IPO companies, however, neither of these situations should occur
save in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the benefits of an unbiased
takeover regime available to all present and future public companies are
likely large relative to the cost of small frictions—the potential mismatch of
the default rule to the particular company and the cost (and potential diffi-
culty) that some installed base companies may face in securing shareholder
approval to change the default. Thus, if the choice were to be based exclu-
94 Although we rely on the founders’ ability to contract with investors on anything when
the stakes are sufficiently high, we recognize that the takeover screens set when the companies
first go public may become inefficient at a later stage. Unless founders have chosen to make or
request specific commitments and bet their own money on that choice, the rule governing
adaptation of the company’s charter to new circumstances should be the majoritarian principle
that has traditionally guided the evolution of corporate contracts. Regarding the problem of
midstream opportunism in implementing control enhancements, see Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluat-
ing Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 810 (1987).
95 See Mario Becht, Reciprocity in Takeovers, in REFORMING COMPANY LAW AND TAKE-
OVER LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 41, 647, 649–50.
96 See infra section III.D.
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sively on efficiency considerations, we would not recommend different de-
faults for installed-base companies.
Consider first the situation in which the default rules are not efficient
for a particular installed-base company. The central criterion for choosing
the default rules is that they should be easy to opt out of when they are not
efficient. This property would apply to installed-base as well as to IPO com-
panies. Managers would be free to impose takeover restrictions so long as
shareholders can be convinced that the restrictions would increase the com-
pany’s value.
Similar reasoning applies to controlling shareholders claiming that the
mandatory bid rule is a barrier to changes in control that also would benefit
non-controlling shareholders.97 In other words, installed-base companies
suddenly facing the new takeover-unbiased regime would be in the same
position as IPO companies that initially stick to the statutory defaults but
want to change them later on. The only residual difference is the reliance of
those who benefited from the pre-reform regime. On analysis, this is also not
a significant problem from an efficiency perspective.
Controlling shareholders would not be concerned with reliance issues,
at least where, as in Europe, the mandatory bid rule is already in place.
Reliance, then, would only be a problem for management-controlled compa-
nies in those countries where shareholder choice is not the default screen on
hostile takeovers. In this situation, shareholders’ taking advantage of the
change of regime may deprive managers of explicitly or implicitly bar-
gained-for job security.
In our view, the claim of serious managerial reliance is unpersuasive
for a number of reasons. First, management having significant firm-specific
human capital investments at stake can at least partly protect them by con-
tract; a reform based on default rules would not override contractual protec-
tions—including golden parachutes. In addition, managers have some
discretion to take into account the impact that setting corporate strategy has
on takeovers. That discretion would give them some bargaining power in
securing additional protection for their firm-specific human capital invest-
ments if a pro-takeover default regime is introduced.98 Finally, management’s
firm-specific human capital investments are likely to be small in the aggre-
gate compared to the benefits to shareholders from a more efficient takeover
regime. But the loss of the human capital investments to managers may be
large enough to trigger collective political action by them, a concern we
address in the next section.
Incumbents’ opportunism may also generate inefficiency in the face of
takeover reform. Under an unbiased takeover regime, previously mandatory
97 Note that there would be no problem with 1S1V because this is already a default rule
everywhere and all the current opt-outs by existing companies would maintain their validity
after the reform.
98 Arlen & Talley, supra note 6, at 581–85. R
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provisions would become defaults, which then could be opted out of to take
advantage of non-controlling shareholders. The takeover-unbiased regime
we propose, however, is designed to curb opportunistic behavior. As devel-
oped in the previous section, the choice of defaults would be biased against
the interest of those in control to avoid midstream opportunistic changes,
whether they are managers or controlling shareholders. When applied to in-
stalled-base companies, this criterion corresponds to the solution long advo-
cated by Professors Bebchuk and Hamdani for countering managerial
opportunism in the face of corporate law evolution.99 While incumbent man-
agers are unlikely to consent to opting out of pro-management defaults,
shareholder choice defaults provide sufficient guarantees against opportunis-
tic opt-outs without displacing efficient ones. Especially in the current U.S.
environment of predominantly institutional ownership and high shareholder
meeting turnout,100 managers could persuade shareholders to accept only ef-
ficient opt-outs.
A default mandatory bid rule is also biased against the interest of the
controlling shareholder, but this may not be sufficient to counter the incum-
bents’ opportunism. When the controlling shareholder has sufficient voting
power to approve a charter amendment, she could unilaterally opt out of the
mandatory bid rule. As we have argued earlier, opting out of the mandatory
bid rule is not necessarily inefficient. But unlike IPO companies, controlling
shareholders of installed-base companies could scrap the mandatory bid rule
without paying a price for it,101 thereby redistributing wealth from investors
to themselves.102 Therefore, while the case for restricting controlling share-
holders’ ability to opt out of the mandatory bid rule may be ambiguous from
the perspective of efficiency, the distributional concerns are much stronger.
In the next section, we address the political economy barriers to takeover
reform that lead to considering redistribution, rather than only efficiency, in
identifying the default rules for installed-base companies.
99 Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 63, at 491–93.
100 See generally David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, 2 ANN.
REV. FIN. ECON. 103 (2010); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 4.
101 This concern motivated SEC efforts in the U.S. to block midstream dual class recapital-
izations to force management to pay for the acquisition of control they did not previously have.
See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Stock, supra note 94, at 808.
102 As it allows for value-decreasing takeovers, this outcome can be inefficient in the pres-
ence of pecuniary private benefits of control, i.e. where the legal constraints on minority share-
holder expropriation are weak and/or in the presence of control enhancement mechanisms. The
former circumstance lowers the cost of expropriation, which increases the incentives to extract
pecuniary private benefits. The latter increases the benefits of selling to a looter. See Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, 109 Q. J. ECON. 957, 980
(1994), and Bebchuk et al., supra note 49, at 304–05.
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D. Overcoming Resistance: A Special Default Regime for
Installed-base Companies
Redistribution resulting from regulatory change is inherently an issue of
political economy. Redistribution among participants within installed-base
companies is thus the problem confronting the introduction of an unbiased
takeover law in jurisdictions featuring a different regime. Resistance from
those having entitlements in the status quo, rather than uncertainty over the
efficient rules for installed-base companies, threatens to stifle takeover re-
form despite its overall desirability. To be sure, this phenomenon, which we
refer to as the “Olson problem” after Mancur Olson’s insightful analysis of
the impact of interest groups on regulatory change,103 applies to virtually any
benevolent legal reform. Efficient reform is Kaldor-Hicks efficient,104 typi-
cally harming the established economic and political elites that enjoy eco-
nomic rents from the status quo in an amount less than the benefits to other
participants in the corporate enterprise.105 Although these rents are wasteful
for society as a whole, the rentiers do not easily give them up. Those with a
vested interest in these endowments constitute powerful pressure groups
against legal change. Due to the homogeneity of their interests and the politi-
cal influence that accompanies their rents, they can be very effective at lob-
bying against regulatory reform.
The Olson problem is acute in corporate governance, which distributes
endowments among parties carrying conflicting interests. It is particularly
acute in takeover law because it unavoidably allocates control entitlements
among management, controlling shareholders, and non-controlling share-
holders.106 From a political economy perspective, the first two groups are
more worrisome. Because they typically enjoy rents respectively from take-
over restrictions and limited protection of minority shareholders, they can be
expected to oppose an unbiased takeover regime whose defaults are pro-
takeover and protective of minority shareholders. Conversely, institutional
investors can be expected to oppose reforms transforming previously
mandatory protections of their interests into default rules, although they may
only be effective in resisting legal change where they hold sufficiently con-
centrated stakes to act as a coordinated interest group.107 In this situation,
103 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAG-
FLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES passim (1982); Id., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUB-
LIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS passim (1965) (describing how well-organized
interest groups may successfully organize resistance against welfare-enhancing reforms).
104 See supra note 19.
105 See, e.g., Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 14, at 477–78.
106 We address the relevance of the impact of takeover law on “stakeholders” supra text
accompanying notes 19–20. R
107 The U.S. and the U.K.—the two iconic dispersed-ownership countries in corporate
governance—historically differ in this respect. In the U.S., individual institutional investors
historically have held smaller, more dispersed stakes in U.S. companies than U.K. institutional
investors have held in U.K. companies. Compare MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 223 (1994), with BRIAN
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overcoming the Olson problem is crucial to making the introduction of an
unbiased takeover law politically viable. Building on the previous work of
Professors Hansmann and Pargendler with one of us, we advocate regulatory
dualism as a solution.108
Regulatory dualism is based on a simple intuition. When the chance is
high that vested interests would succeed in blocking the introduction of a
new, more efficient reform, resistance may be avoided by allowing those
having endowments in the existing regime to continue to be governed by it.
At least nominally, the existing elites should be indifferent to introduction of
the new regime, with the benefit that a more efficient regime at least be-
comes available for other businesses, particularly new entrants. The disad-
vantage is that inefficiency will persist as long as the installed-base is
governed by the pre-reform regime, which will be considerable since in-
stalled-base companies at any point in time will dwarf the next round of new
companies. Thus, the approach is most attractive in dynamic circumstances,
where the goal is to encourage growth in new businesses.109 Regulatory dual-
ism has particular attraction for takeover reform, since takeovers are them-
selves an important dynamic mechanism.
We must be careful not to overstate how cleanly regulatory dualism
operates; elites may still have something to lose. To the extent that the re-
form regime is successful, one result will be to foster competition leading to
the natural erosion of rents and, of equal importance, an erosion of the corre-
sponding political influence. Our proposal is premised on the expectation
that, compared to the risk of full reform and the attendant sudden elimination
of rents, the threat of future competition will be too small to justify the costs
of lobbying against reform and the risk of losing. The experience with regu-
latory dualism in Brazil, Germany, and the EU (in the case of Brazil an
intentional strategy and in Germany and the EU perhaps less instrumental)
shows that this approach can provide an effective path towards evolutionary
reform in corporate governance.110
How would regulatory dualism apply to an unbiased takeover regime?
The obvious strategy is to set different default rules for installed-base and
IPO companies. The former would be subject to default rules that are identi-
cal to the rules in place before adoption of the reform.  The latter, in contrast,
would be subject to the default rules described in section III.B. We empha-
size that no group of companies would be bound by one regime. The benefit
of regulatory dualism as opposed to, for example, grandfathering, is that
existing companies and IPO companies have access to both regimes and the
R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED,
337–81 (2008). In recent years, the stakes of U.S. institutional investors have become signifi-
cantly larger and more concentrated. See supra note 4. R
108 Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 14.
109 Id. at 478–79.
110 Id. at 482–512. See also Enriques, supra note 50, at 481 (providing a further example
of successful regulatory dualism involving privatized companies in Italy).
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choice is reversible at any time. The only difference is the default. Default
Regime A, mirroring the status quo, applies to installed-base companies. De-
fault Regime B applies to companies going public after the reform enters
into force. We intentionally avoid labelling the two regimes as respectively
‘old’ and ‘new’. The two regimes must be on equal footing and, most impor-
tantly, equally legitimate. The properties we have just described distinguish
regulatory dualism from similar reform techniques, such as grandfathering
companies subject to the old regime, menu choice between old and new
rules, and simply allowing opting out of the old rules.111
What most prominently distinguishes Regime A from the takeover-un-
biased approach is that the default rules chosen respect the existing endow-
ments of the vested interests. The goal is to prevent them from acting to kill
the reform by structuring the regime such that the expected costs to them of
the new dualistic regime are lower than the expected cost of lobbying.112
Because we want to avoid mandatory rules in order to also allow installed-
base companies the opportunity to alter their chosen takeover regime as con-
ditions change over time, the rules for opting out of the defaults should con-
fer upon those who benefit from the status quo the same power to block
future changes in the default rule as they have under the current regime. This
reflects another key difference with the unbiased takeover Regime B. Not
only are the default rules not necessarily biased against the interests of those
in control (on the contrary, they often explicitly protect those interests), but
also, they retain the existing barriers to other groups causing an opt-out of
the default if it becomes inefficient with the passage of time. Thus, incum-
bents are not made worse off because of the reform, but neither are they
made better off. Incumbents who were exposed to change in the default rule
under the previous regime, for example, should remain so exposed.
This friction is undesirable because it restricts the dynamic character of
an unbiased takeover regime, which is one of its important attributes. How-
ever, it is the price of making the more efficient Regime B politically viable
and the price is capped: installed-base companies retain the option to buy out
the endowments of incumbents and choose the unbiased takeover Regime B
(or parts thereof) whenever there are sufficient gains from doing so.
We offer a final thought on the trade-off between economic efficiency
and political economy in setting default rules for takeover reform. In the
end, whether a regulatory dualism framework for reform is desirable de-
111 See Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 14, at 521–25 (discussing the advan- R
tages of regulatory dualism over grandfathering and other similar regulatory techniques).
112 See text accompanying notes 62–64 (the choice of a default rule depends on the rela-
tive power of different corporate participants to alter the regulatory imposed default rule, but
in any event, the altering cost is not zero). As Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 14, R
at 479, observe, the extent of elite power depends on the particular country and context. For
instance, the reconcentration of equity ownership in the U.S. has given rise to a significant
number of corporate level pro-shareholder changes in default rules. For example, a significant
number of companies have eliminated staggered boards in favor of annual elections, a critical
element of an effective poison pill. See Listokin, supra note 58, at 292–95.
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pends importantly on one’s expectations about both the speed of economic
change and its source. The best case for protecting existing governance en-
dowments in installed-base companies is where the rate of economic change
is high and the source of the innovations driving change is outside the in-
stalled base. In this case, competition will reduce the future influence of the
installed base. This is, in effect, a Silicon Valley story of disruptive change
rather than one of continuing improvement by installed-base market
leaders.113
IV. AN APPLICATION TO EU TAKEOVER LAW
A. European Takeover Law: A Primer
To illustrate how an unbiased takeover law would work, we compare it
with the existing regime within the EU and show why the former would be
superior to the latter. As throughout this article, we focus on three core is-
sues of takeover law: whether (1) the board or the shareholders make the
final decision on a hostile bid; (2) controlling shareholders are free to sell
their controlling block; and (3) companies are free to deviate from 1S1V.
While other pieces of European legislation have an impact on such matters,
the Directive, albeit deferring to national laws to a wide extent, addresses
each of them.114
With respect to the allocation of decision-making power on takeover
bids, the Directive requires only that a member state allows individual com-
panies to opt into the so-called board neutrality rule (BNR), if the member
state does not itself impose it or adopt it as a default.115 In spelling out the
BNR, which requires boards to obtain shareholders’ authorization of any ac-
tion, other than seeking alternative bids, which may result in the frustration
of a pending bid, Art. 9 expresses a clear preference for such a rule. How-
ever, because Art. 12 makes the BNR optional for member states, EU
lawmakers’ preference for it is, at best, an instance of expressive law,116 and
an ineffective one at that.117
113 See generally CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA (2000); Ronald J.
Gilson, Locating Innovation: Technology, Organizational Structure and Financial Con-
tracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885  (2010).
114 See Luca Enriques, European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach, 22
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 623, 627–31 (2011). The Directive also contains so-called “traffic rules” on
takeovers, such as those requiring that an offering document be published, setting a minimum
offer period, imposing proration, etc. These rules help shareholders make the right decision
about a takeover, while at the same time increasing the cost of takeovers: hence, they cannot
arguably categorized as unbiased (see id. at 629–30). In line with the rest of our article, how-
ever, we take such rules as given for the purpose of our analysis.
115 Council Directive 2004/25/EC, art. 9, 12, 2004 O.J. (L 142/21).
116 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (explaining the expressive function of law).
117 See generally infra text accompanying notes 121–23.
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Member states may also opt for a selective board neutrality rule, based
on so-called reciprocity: a state that adopts the BNR may choose to allow its
companies not to apply it “if they become the subject of an offer launched
by a[nother] company which does not apply [the BNR] as they do.”118 In
other words, if a member state opts in to the reciprocity regime, defenses are
available to fend off a bid from a company that has itself opted out of the
BNR or whose jurisdiction does not impose it.
The economic rationale for reciprocity is weak at best.119 This defense
provision, together with the optional character of the BNR, was the outcome
of a political compromise motivated by the Olson problem: resistance of
interest groups to any more effective pro-takeover policy.120
The optional character of the BNR has allowed some important member
states previously relying on a board veto rule to retain that rule as a default.
Such is the case in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, and Poland.121 Hungary, in turn, moved from a pre-Directive
mandatory BNR to a default rule allowing the board to adopt defensive tac-
tics.122 Finally, a number of member states have chosen to allow their com-
panies to opt in to reciprocity, including France where reciprocity has been
given a broad interpretation—reportedly, over one quarter of companies in
the CAC-40 index (the market index for the largest publicly traded French
companies) had opted in to it as of 2010.123 The experience with the EU
countries that have opted out of the BNR is that not a single company has
exercised its right to opt in to the BNR through its articles of association.124
Similarly, there is no EU regulation concerning 1S1V in the Directive
or elsewhere. 1S1V is the default in all member states, none of which ban all
deviations from it.125 However, the Directive requires member states to allow
companies to opt in to the so-called breakthrough rule (BTR) if member
118 Arts. 12(3) and (5) of the Directive. Opt-in by individual companies is subject to share-
holder meeting authorization to be given no earlier than eighteen months prior to when the bid
has become public. Art. 12(5).
119 Becht, supra note 95, at 659–62.
120 See, e.g., Joseph A. McCahery & Eric P.M. Vermeulen, Does the Takeover Bids Direc-
tive Need Revision?, 6 (TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-006, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1547861.
121 See Paul L. Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster, & Emilie van de Walle de Ghelcke, The
Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?, in COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTION-
ISM: NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 105, 139 tbl.3 (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2010).
122 Id. at 142. Italy also briefly opted for a board veto rule at the end of 2008, but reversed
that choice less than one year later by making the BNR default. Id.
123 Id. at 147–49. In Portugal reciprocity applies automatically to all companies, despite
the Directive’s requirement that it should be subject to individual companies’ opt-in. Id. at 147.
124 See id. at 145.
125 See ISS, ECGI & Shearman & Sterling, Report on the Proportionality Principle in the
European Union (External Study commissioned by the European Commission 15, 2007),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/shareholders/study/final_report_en.pdf.
While some countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, prohibit multiple voting shares, no
member state bans all dual-class shares structures. For instance, Germany, Italy, and Spain
allow for the issuance of preference nonvoting shares (up to a threshold calculated as a propor-
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states themselves choose not to impose it or adopt it as a default.126 The BTR
selectively reinstates 1S1V pending a takeover bid or once a takeover bid is
successful. More precisely, restrictions on the transfer of securities or voting
rights, whether contained in the corporate charter or in shareholder agree-
ments, would not apply while a takeover bid is pending. Further,
“[m]ultiple-vote securities shall carry only one vote each at the general
meeting of shareholders which decides on any defensive measures.”127 In the
event of a successful bid (leading to acquisition of 75% or more of the target
voting shares), restrictions on the transfer of shares or on voting rights would
be ineffective, subject to compensation, “at the first general meeting of
shareholders following closure of the bid, called by the offeror in order to
amend the articles of association or to remove or appoint board members.”128
With the exception of the Baltic Republics129 (and Italy between 2007
and 2008130) no member state has chosen to fully adopt the BTR whether as
a mandatory or a default rule.131 However, France has adopted a reduced-
scope BTR as a mandatory rule,132 and Italy has retained its 1998 provision
declaring ineffective the shareholder agreements that restrict parties’ free-
dom to sell their shares pending a bid for all the voting shares.133As with the
BNR, no individual company has ever opted into the BTR where it is not
mandated.134
Finally, the Directive imposes a mandatory bid rule by requiring the
acquirer of a presumptively controlling block—whose minimum size is set
by member states135—to offer to purchase the remaining shares on the same
terms as paid to the selling controller. The mandatory bid rule effectively
compels controlling shareholders wishing to part with control to share the
control premium with minority shareholders. Neither member states nor in-
dividual companies have discretion to opt out of the rule.136
tion of outstanding shares); and Denmark prohibits nonvoting shares but allows for the issu-
ance of multiple voting shares. Id.
126 The Directive, supra note 16, at 21 (art. 12).
127 Id. at 20 (art. 11).
128 Id.
129 See Eur. Comm’n, Report on the Implementation of the Takeover Bids Directive 7
SEC(2007) 268 (Feb. 21, 2007).
130 See Guido Ferrarini & Geoffrey P. Miller, A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in
the United States and Europe, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301, 324–26 (2009).
131 CHRISTOPHE CLERC ET AL., A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN TAKE-
OVER REGULATION 80 (2012).
132 Id. at 80–81 (“In France, the limitation of voting rights provided in the articles of
association of a company subject to a takeover bid are [sic] suspended for the first general
meeting following the closing of the bid if the offeror, either alone or in concert, holds capital
or voting rights in excess of two-thirds of the offeree company.”).
133 See Decreto Legislativo 24 Febbraio 1998, n.24 (It.), art. 123(3).
134 CLERC ET AL., supra note 131, at 123.
135 The threshold across member states is normally thirty percent or one third of the
shares. See id. at 55.
136 To be sure, member states have broad discretion in identifying exemptions, an area in
which there is great variation among them. See CLERC ET AL., supra note 131, at 61–65. One
of us has even questioned to what extent the mandatory bid rule in the Directive is, in fact,
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B. The Case for Revising the Takeover Bid Directive
The unbiased approach we propose would lead to a superior framework
for regulating takeovers within the EU, especially, of course, for IPO com-
panies.137 First, under the current rules, individual companies cannot opt out
of the mandatory bid rule, which, as we have argued, may unduly restrict
takeover activity (i.e., when it applies to companies whose shareholders may
otherwise strike a better bargain by opting out of it). Second, many member
states have adopted rules contrary to what a takeover-unbiased approach
would recommend.138
This outcome, together with the similar absence of companies opting
into the BNR in member states where it is neither mandatory nor default,
matches the theoretical and empirical prediction that companies typically
will not opt in to pro-takeover rules. This was the basis for the choice of pro-
takeover defaults in the previous section.139
An unbiased takeover law should include a default BNR and a default
1S1V, but not a default BTR. Moreover, the presence of the Olson problem
is obvious. As a matter of fact, from the time the Directive was adopted,
existing elites have successfully pressured member states to adopt or retain
antitakeover rules.140
mandatory, in light of the ample leeway member states’ national laws, and enforcements agen-
cies have in defining its contours and in deciding on specific fact patterns. See Luca Enriques,
The Mandatory Bid Rule in the Takeover Directive: Harmonization Without Foundation?, 1
EUR. COMP. & FIN. L. REV. 440, 445–46 (2004).
137 Given the variations in takeover rules’ outcomes that the current takeover framework
leaves open for individual member states and the ensuing differentiation in domestic takeover
laws, one may wonder why one would bother, as we do, to develop an unbiased takeover
regime within the EU, when European businesses already have the freedom to (re)incorporate
in any other member state under European law. First, we note that the current European regime
is less rich in terms of menu rules than the one we propose. Given the absence of regulatory
competition, as opposed to mere regulatory arbitrage in the EU, it is highly unlikely that any
member state will supply the menu rules we put forth. Second, the Directive contains provi-
sions (namely, the mandatory bid rule, which most companies opt out of) that are incompatible
with our model. Finally, while it is possible to cherry-pick specific takeover law provisions
under the Directive, this can only be done with regard to very specific issues (traffic rules and
pricing of the mandatory bid) and by forgoing a domestic listing. See Luca Enriques & Tobias
H. Tro¨ger, Issuer Choice in the EU and Its Impact on the Market for Corporate Law, 3 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 4 (2008). A broader choice of takeover law rules would
require reincorporation, thus bundling the choice of a takeover regime with a number of other
corporate law provisions that may or may not be optimal for the individual company. Because
of the persisting mandatory structure of European laws, “bundling,” i.e. the fact that the
choice of a takeover law regime is derivative of the choice of corporate law more generally
makes regulatory arbitrage a poor substitute for choice of takeover rules at the individual
company level.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 121–23.
139 Conversely, in the only European country where the BNR is merely default (Italy,
which amended its takeover law to that effect in 2009), nine companies have opted out of it,
including FIAT, a Blue Chip company traditionally leading, for better or for worse, in Italian
corporate governance practices. See CLERC ET AL., supra note 131, at 78.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 121–23.
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Against this backdrop, a reform of the Directive to establish an unbi-
ased takeover law in the EU would improve on the status quo.141 In EU
jargon, the reshaping we propose would be an application of the horizontal
subsidiarity principle: the choice of the takeover regime would devolve to
the level where this choice is made more efficiently: at the individual com-
pany level.142 In addition, both default and menu rules should be identified at
the EU level. This is also an application, albeit less intuitive, of the horizon-
tal subsidiarity principle. Because the most efficient choice of the takeover
regime is the one made at the level of the individual company, the default
and menu rules, which enable that choice and make it effective, are better
established at the EU level than at the member-state level. Member states
have in fact stronger incentives to cater to the interests of incumbents
(whether managers or controlling shareholders), and will therefore tend to
undersupply rules favoring efficient choices at the individual company
level.143
The goal in setting takeover regulation entirely at the EU level is to
avoid the protectionist stance that would naturally emerge if default choices
were made at the member-state level. Providing member states with discre-
tion as to the content of defaults and menus exposes them to focused lobby-
ing by interest groups who seek to preserve the status quo. Managers, for
example, may lobby for a board veto default in countries mandating the
BNR, while controlling shareholders may lobby for the absence of a
mandatory bid as default. In this context, it is hard to imagine that menu
rules supporting unbiased choice by IPO and installed-base companies
would gain any traction at the member state level.
We contend that regulatory dualism at the European level can effec-
tively counter this problem of political economy. Managers and dominant
shareholders are less effective lobbyists at the European level than at the
141 The European Commission appears to be satisfied with the status quo. In its conclu-
sion, the Commission identifies as in need of review only one point of detail in the regulation
of the mandatory bid: “acting in concert” (when shareholders cooperate in acquiring shares,
which may trigger the mandatory bid rule, or in resisting a takeover bid). The Report also flags
other issues related to the mandatory bid rule, such as national derogations, but the intention is
to deal with them via infringement procedures or recommendations. With respect to the BNR
and the BTR, the Commission’s view is that the present framework is satisfactory and that no
review is warranted. Hence, no overhaul of the Directive is to be expected any time soon. See
Eur. Comm’n, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region: Application of
Directive 2004/25/EC on takeover bids, COM (2012) 347 Final (June 28, 2012).
142 We could find no study addressing whether it would be consistent with the principle of
vertical subsidiarity for the Union to require member states to defer to private parties’ choices,
as we propose here. However, we can see no reason why such form of EU regulation should be
contrary to the European Treaties. In fact, this would not be the first instance in which the EU
requires member states to allow companies a choice between different regimes. See Luca Enri-
ques, EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?, 27 U. PENN. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 1, 26–30 (2006).
143 See Ferrarini & Miller, supra note 130, passim (arguing that “takeover regulation in
both Europe and the United States becomes increasingly bidder-friendly with increasing geo-
graphic scope” and providing support for their thesis with regard to both the U.S. and Europe).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\4-1\HLB103.txt unknown Seq: 38  4-JUN-14 11:42
122 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 4
national level in resisting takeover laws that are not biased in their favor: in
general, activist shareholders and institutional shareholders, who prefer an
active market for corporate control, can counteract insiders’ antitakeover
pressures more effectively at the supranational level.144
C. Implementing an Unbiased Takeover Law in the EU
In order to make the introduction of an unbiased takeover law politi-
cally viable, legal reform should first mute the opposition from the constitu-
encies carrying a vested interest in the status quo. To this end, the
overhauled Directive should include two regimes. Regime A, applying by
default to installed-base companies, should replicate the status quo in each
member state. Regime B, applying by default to new-IPO companies, should
be entirely takeover-unbiased. Keeping a suboptimal Regime A in place for
installed-base companies allows a new, more efficient Regime B to be made
available for all companies, old and new.
The implementation of regulatory dualism should take into account,
however, the substantial variety in how the 28 EU member states have im-
plemented the Directive. Thus, the Regime A supported by EU law will ef-
fectively consist of (i) different sets of default rules, depending on the
member state where the company is listed; and (ii) additional default rules
on matters previously regulated by mandatory rules. The latter applies most
prominently to the mandatory bid rule.
Two specific applications of this framework—the BNR and the BTR—
illustrate a regulatory dualism strategy. The BNR should become a default
rule in those member states where it is currently mandated, and board veto
should remain the default in those member states that have so chosen al-
ready.145 Similarly, the BTR should not be the default except in those few
member states (the Baltic Republics and, with regard to their limited-scope
BTRs, France and Italy) that have not opted out of it.
Setting the default rules to correspond to the existing entitlements must
be complemented by the appropriate procedural rules for altering the default
regime. More precisely, the new regime should deal with three problems.
First, managers’ or controlling shareholders’ opportunism should not drive
the companies’ choice. Second, because the optimal openness to takeovers
is, in important respects, a function of time, industry developments, and
evolving ownership structures, a company’s choices should allow dynamic
responses to changes in conditions: reversing the initial (implicit or explicit)
144 See id. On the role of British institutional investors in shaping the shareholder-friendly
regime in the UK, see John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1727, 1767–76 (2007).
145 By the same token, those member states that have adopted the reciprocity exception to
the BNR should retain it along with the BNR default. See supra text accompanying notes
112–13.
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choice should not be unreasonably difficult. Third, the lack of practicable
alternatives to the default regime may lead to inefficient inertia.
Regulatory dualism can effectively overcome political resistance to the
introduction of a takeover-unbiased law only if procedural rules permit those
with an interest in maintaining the status quo the same right to block the
decision to opt out of the status quo as they have under the current regime.
This approach reflects a pragmatic recognition of the barriers to reform. The
endowments to be protected under the mandatory bid rule are those of the
investors who could face a forced redistribution of wealth by controlling
shareholders opting out of the rule, for reasons of opportunism as well as of
efficiency. To prevent this, installed-base companies should only be allowed
to opt out of the mandatory bid rule with the approval of the majority of the
minority. The same standard should govern opting out of pro-takeover rules,
such as the BNR or the BTR, when they cease to be mandatory and become
default.
The requirements are different, however, for opting into either the BNR
or the BTR in those countries where they are not currently default or
mandatory. According to the Directive, such countries already have to allow
for an opt-in.146 There would be no reason to make such an opt-in more
difficult by requiring the approval, respectively, of management and of con-
trolling shareholders, if that is not already the case under national company
laws.
We believe that once the political economy problem is addressed in the
fashion we have outlined above, the introduction of an unbiased takeover
regime will outperform the current version of the Directive on three counts.
First, a European regime that is more pro-takeover than the one currently in
place will govern new IPO companies by default. We have labelled this Re-
gime B.
Second, Regime B will be more unbiased than the status quo because
companies can opt out of the pro-takeover default whenever it does not fit
the circumstances: takeover restrictions become more efficient, for example,
in post-crisis periods of increased idiosyncratic stock price volatility.147
Finally, and most optimistically, an unbiased takeover regime is a bet
on the future and on the expectation that, under current circumstances, real
economic growth will come from new companies rather than the installed
base. The European Commission, with its efforts to encourage innovation
and venture capital markets, shares this expectation.148 Of course, this expec-
146 See supra text accompanying note 115.
147 See Merritt Fox, Edward Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crises and Share Price
Unpredictability: Reasons and Implications (American Law and Economics Ass’n, Working
Paper 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=240712.
148 See, e.g., Venture Capital, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/poli-
cies/finance/risk-capital/venture-capital (last visited May 22, 2014) (describing the Commis-
sion’s efforts “to unify the venture capital market in order to provide innovative small
businesses with easier access to financing”).
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tation may prove to be wrong. However, even a new takeover Regime A,
whose defaults are shaped by the political reality of the Olson problem, can-
not make things worse. The Commission’s decision to leave the Directive in
place without significant reform is consistent with half of our proposal: it
stops short of freeing up the dynamic sector of the economy, which our
separation of the default rules governing installed-base and IPO companies
would accomplish.
Thus, the EU should complement status quo-biased Regime A with a
uniform Regime B, which will be the operative default for every company
that goes public in any of the 28 EU member states after implementation.
This regime should consist of primarily default and menu rules, chosen ac-
cording to the criteria discussed in section II. Again, the default rules should
be easy to opt out of if they are inefficient for a particular company, and they
should be biased against the interest of those in control.
Finally, as we have argued throughout this article, defining an appropri-
ate set of menu rules from which companies can craft a bespoke takeover
structure is crucial to make opt-outs a viable alternative. This is especially
the case in Continental Europe, where the mandatory structure of corporate
law is deeply ingrained in the minds of lawyers and judges.149 Here again,
legislation at the EU level can play a role by requiring member states to
introduce menu provisions currently unavailable under national law.150 Two
applications of this approach are the poison pill and a reformed BTR, which
we briefly discuss below.
The reformed Directive should include the poison pill among its menu
rules. The reason is that the poison pill is an unbiased device, whose an-
titakeover effect depends entirely on the rules governing its redemption.151
The poison pill’s advantage lies in the simplicity of its form; its complexity
arises when specifying the timing of its redemption—something the Dela-
ware courts have struggled with for some twenty-five years.152 As a result,
149 See Katharina Pistor, Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Econo-
mies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES, AND MARKETS IN
EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 249, 263–67 (Klaus J. Hopt, Eddy Wymeersch, Hideki Kanda &
Harald Baum eds., 2005).
150 In principle, EU law could simply prohibit member states from constraining freedom
of contract on takeovers. But such a prohibition would be ineffective, both because it would be
easy to circumvent and because it would say nothing about which menus should be available
under national law. Supplying menu rules directly at the EU level is therefore the best strategy
to prevent member states from undermining an unbiased structure for takeover law. Neverthe-
less, European regulation should not prevent member states from enacting their own menu
rules in this area.
151 See Gilson, supra note 24, at 39. R
152 In Delaware, for example, the case law provides an informal but contested menu, over
which the Delaware Supreme Court and the Chancery Court have been at odds for twenty-five
years over the tenure of three different Chancellors. See supra note 24. In an opinion written R
by Chancellor Chandler, the Court of Chancery recently commented that the Supreme Court
had determined that a staggered board did not make a proxy fight unrealistic, even though the
Chancery Court was not aware of a single occasion in which a bidder actually pursued proxy
contests at two successive annual meetings. See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas,
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including the pill in a fully specified menu term is essential to its usefulness.
For example, the Canadian Securities Administrators recently proposed reg-
ulatory menu terms for a valid poison pill. Under this proposal, a board
would be allowed to keep a poison pill in place indefinitely so long as a
majority of shareholders approve the pill within 90 days of its adoption and
reaffirm this support in an annual vote.153
If the menu terms are carefully crafted, the availability of the poison
pill can go a long way towards making all other defensive tactics (and partic-
ularly value-destroying ones) redundant. The poison pill is thus a useful de-
vice for IPO companies whose management wishes to retain the 1S1V
default while reserving more discretion than the shareholder choice default
provides. In this setting, a blockholder of a company with a pill in place
remains more exposed to a takeover than if she held high voting shares in a
two-class structure (an option available at the IPO stage) because the limits
imposed by the menu terms would constrain the pill’s impact compared to
leveraged votes from the two-class structure.154 The pill can also be more
easily dismantled than collapsing a two-class stock structure, because re-
deeming the pill does not require changing the rights of outstanding stock.
Thus, in theory, making a pill available provides an IPO company with a less
entrenching (depending on the terms governing its use) solution than a dual-
class stock structure. So long as the poison pill is or can be deemed to be
incompatible with the current state of EU law or with the law of some mem-
ber states,155 a revised Directive should provide a menu term that fully speci-
fies the terms of an acceptable poison pill.
An unbiased Directive could also enhance freedom of choice at the
company level by offering a slightly different version of the BTR as a menu
rule. The BTR is currently a menu rule in the vast majority of EU countries,
but no company has ever opted into it. This suggests that the BTR is not
useful in its current form. As emphasized by various commentators, the BTR
Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57–59 (Del. Ch. 2011). Chancellor Chandler also expressed his disagreement
with the Supreme Court’s view. In this respect Chandler’s position echoed the same disagree-
ment voiced by his predecessor (see City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787, 797–99 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Chancellor William T. Allen)), and his successor (see Chesa-
peake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 324–25 (2000) (then Vice Chancellor, now Chief Justice Leo E.
Strine, Jr.)).
153 Security Holder Rights Plans, 26 O.S.C.B. (proposed Mar. 14, 2013) (Can.) available
at http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_ni_20130314_62-105_security-holder-rights-
plan.htm.
154 Note that the U.S. experience shows that a poison pill can be crafted to prevent proxy
fights as well (by restricting its redemption by newly elected board members) and to make it
difficult to redeem at all (through a “dead-hand” pill). The Delaware courts, however, quickly
invalidated this overly clever legal effort.  Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A. 2d 1180 (Del.Ch.
1998). We do not need to delve here into the details of what restrictions on the terms of the pill
should characterize the menu rule we envisage. Of course, careful attention should be given to
these aspects in drafting the menu rule.
155 Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: The
German Example, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EUROPE, supra note 41,
541, 547.
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is effective against only some control enhancements (e.g., dual-class shares),
but not against others (e.g., pyramids).156 In addition, whenever the BTR is
triggered, the person whose control enhancement is removed is entitled to
“equitable compensation of any loss suffered.”157 The latter provision has
created significant uncertainty in the member states, which also may explain
why most of them have opted out of the BTR.158 However, if reinterpreted
contractually within the framework of our unbiased approach, an individu-
ally crafted BTR may play a useful role as a sunset clause.159 In a setting
where the founder believes that the market will undervalue the company’s
stock because of its dependence on future growth options, a BTR’s becoming
effective at a specified date (e.g., ten years after the IPO) would both credi-
bly inform the market of the reason for the departure from 1S1V and provide
a timeframe in which growth options will have to materialize, in effect buy-
ing the founder time. While we have shown earlier that a leveraged control
structure always gives the controlling shareholder an option to give it up if
the price of the leverage as reflected in the market discount gets too high,
opting into a sunset-style BTR may allow the controlling shareholder to
avoid some or all of the discount that would reflect the anticipation of pri-
vate benefit extraction.160
CONCLUSION
Crafting effective takeover regulation and reconstructing existing regu-
latory structures requires that we solve simultaneous equations. First, take-
over regulation must be efficient; it must facilitate efficient takeovers and
discourage inefficient takeovers. Devising screens that implement this dis-
tinction is difficult, because the determination must be made based on the
circumstances of particular companies and particular bids. Second, takeover
regulation must be politically viable, that is, it must address the Olson prob-
lem: the ability of incumbents to block regulation that dilutes their existing
endowments. The unbiased takeover regulation presented here solves both
156 See, e.g., Coates IV, supra note 41, at 683–85.
157 See art 11(5) of the Directive.
158 See Peter Mu¨lbert, Make It or Break It: The Break-Through Rule as a Break-Through
for the European Takeover Directive, in REFORMING COMPANY AND TAKEOVER LAW IN EU-
ROPE supra note 41, 711, 735.
159 On the utility of sunset clauses in order to combine flexibility with commitments, see
Bebchuk, supra note 81, at 751–52.
160 In order for the BTR to become an effective menu rule—at least more effective than it
has been so far—the Directive should induce companies to contract on specific issues. This
may require that the restrictions covered by the BTR be identified, compensation for their
removal be defined and an expiration date be fixed as conditions for enforcing the new BTR as
a standard term. For the reasons explained earlier (see supra text accompanying notes 71–75),
corporate contracting cannot be expected to be so creative as to devise entirely tailor-made
sunset clauses for companies that opt into takeover restrictions. However, when this would be
efficiency enhancing, companies can well be expected to opt into an off-the-rack sunset-style
clause featuring little uncertainty as to both its legal enforceability and its effectiveness against
the specific restriction(s) in place.
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equations. It accomplishes this by specifying that shareholders determine a
takeover bid’s success as a default rule. This would apply only to IPO com-
panies: the existing takeover regime would remain the default for installed-
base companies. A strategy of regulatory dualism would put an economi-
cally efficient takeover regime in place and rely on the dynamics of growth
to bring along existing companies.
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